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LAW, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, 
AND THE STATE 
Pluralism or Fragmentation?: 
The Twentieth-Century Employment 
Law Regime in Canada 
Judy Fudge and Eric Tucker 
I. Introduction: Employment Regimes and Fragmented Labour Markets 
ANY ATTEMPT AT A HISTORICAL overview inevitably involves contentious choices, 
including those of focus, the analytic lens to deploy, and the themes that structure 
the narrative. The first and most controversial choice that we have made is that of 
focus. Our topic is the legal regulation of employment in 20th-century Canada. 
Despite the fact that during the 20th century employment has come to be treated as 
a synonym for work, these terms are not equivalent. Employment is a mere subset 
of the broader domain of work; it emerged as a specific legal category in England 
in the 19th century to specify the rights and obligations that comprised a bilateral 
labour market contract. Work, by contrast* captures a much broader range of 
productive activity, including the labour of small independent producers and 
women in the household. The false equivalence of the terms "employment" and 
"work" in the 20th century is evidence of the hegemony of the neo-classical vision 
of the labour market in which employment dominates. 
'R.E. Pahl, On Work: Historical, Comparative and Theoretical Approaches (Oxford 1988). 
Also see Ann Forrest, "The Industrial Relations Significance of Unpaid Work," Labour/ Le 
7>(7vai7,42 ( 1998), 199-225; Belinda Leach, "Industrial Homework, Economic Restructur-
Judy Fudge and Eric Tucker, "Pluralism or Fragmentation?: The Twentieth Century Em-
ployment Law Regime in Canada," Labour/Le Travail, 46 (Fall 2000), 251-306. 
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Our focus on employment reflects the separation of home and waged work that 
characterized the new industrial age. By the turn of the twentieth century, the once 
dominant form of family production was becoming a faint memory in most parts 
of Canada, replaced by a new sexual division of labour characterized by male 
employment and female domestic labour — an arrangement that deepened and 
expanded women's dependence on men's wages. One negative consequence of our 
focus on employment, then, is that it privileges the work experience of men over 
that of women.2 
We also are aware that an exclusive focus on employment is becoming less 
defensible at the end of the 20th century as owners of capital seek ways of getting 
work done that does not entail entering into employment relations. Indeed, the 
coherence of the legal categories of employer and employee is being undermined 
by this inventiveness. We certainly doubt that it will be defensible for a history of 
the legal regulation of work in the 21st century to focus on the sub-category of 
employment. 
Yet, despite its ideological baggage, gender-blindness, and partiality, a review 
of the 20th century focused on the legal regulation of employment is sensible both 
because employment has been the principal means through which productive 
relations were established and governed and because employment relations have 
been the primary subject of the legal regulation of work through most of this 
century. Other ways of organizing work have been subject to far less legal control, 
so that what is really notable in this regard are law's silences and exclusions, not 
its words and actions. Employment relations became a magnet for legal regulation 
precisely because it was through these relations that most families obtained access 
to the means necessary for their survival and reproduction and because, from time 
to time, their conflictual character threatened to disrupt the social order. 
Our analytical lens is that of a regime of legal regulation by which we mean 
the constellation of laws, institutions, and ideologies through which employment 
relations are organized and legitimated. This heuristic allows us to capture both the 
continuities and dynamics of legal regulation as it developed over the 20th century. 
Central to the regime is the contract of employment within which the judiciary 
inscribed the legal subordination of the worker by implying duties of obedience 
and loyalty derived from older notions of status at the same time that it endorsed 
ing and the Meaning of Work," Labour/ Le Travail, 41 (Spring), 97-115; Christopher 
Tomlins, "Why Wait for Industrialism? Work, Legal Culture, and the Example of Early 
America — An Historical Argument," Labor History, 40 ( 1999), 5-33; and Chris Tilly and 
Charles Tilly, Work Under Capitalism (Westview 1999). 
Pat Armstrong and Hugh Armstrong, The Double Ghetto: Canadian Women & Their 
Segregated Work, 3rd ed. (Toronto 1994), 83; Tannis Peikoff and Stephen Brickey, "Cre-
ating Precious Children and Glorified Mothers: A Theoretical Assessment of the Transfor-
mation of Childhood," in Elizabeth Comack and Stephen Brickey, eds., The Social Basis of 
Law, 2nd ed. (Halifax 1991), 71-94; Wally Seccombe, "The Housewife and her Labour 
under Capitalism," New Left Review, 83 (1973), 3-24, 6. 
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free exchange and exclusive private property rights. This juridical construction, 
however, could not resolve the inevitable conflicts over the employment relation 
and its governance fuelled by conflicting material interests and competing visions 
of justice.3 
Three conceptions of justice have been invoked to deal with these conflicts. 
One relies upon market competition for labour to limit the abuses of property rights. 
Voluntary individual contracts, enforced by the courts, guarantee workers market 
freedom. In another conception of justice, workers' collective action to assert and 
enforce employment rights provides the crucial mechanism for the achievement of 
justice by offsetting the employers' superior bargaining power. Democratic free-
doms, especially those of expression and association, provided the legitimacy for 
workers' collective institutions and actions. The third conception is rooted in 
democratic politics and involves direct state regulation of the terms of employment 
in accordance with politically determined norms of social and economic justice.4 
These conceptions of justice were institutionalized in the employment law 
regime, albeit by no means in equal measure. By 1900, the regime consisted roughly 
of three parts : the common law contract of employment, the law of col lective action, 
and statutory minimum standards. While it is tempting to associate each conception 
of justice with a component of the legal regime, reality defies such neat categori-
zations. Class struggle and ideological conflict were endemic throughout the entire 
regime and in each of its components, although the level of contestation ebbed and 
flowed and its location varied. 
The third crucial choice we made is to emphasize the theme of fragmentation, 
and in particular, the role of law in supporting, constituting and challenging 
fragmented labour markets. This theme was selected because it allows us explicitly 
to take issue with industrial pluralism, the predominant approach to post-war 
Canadian employment relations.5 According to it, after World War n, collective 
bargaining legislation administered by independent labour boards combined with 
a system of grievance arbitration to enforce collective agreements, to create a 
Daniel Jacoby, Laboring for Freedom: A New Look at the History of Labor in America 
(Armonk, NY 1998); Harry Glasbeek, "The Contract of Employment at Common Law," in 
John Anderson and Morley Gunderson, eds., Union-Management Relations (Toronto 1982), 
47-77; Alan Fox, Beyond Contract: Work, Power and Trust (London 1974), 185; Margaret 
McCallum, "Labour and the Liberal State: Regulating the Employment Relationship, 
1867-1920," Manitoba Law Journal, 23 (1995), 574-93. 
Jacoby, Laboring for Freedom, 8. 
5Bora Laskin, first as a labour law professor and arbitrator and then as an Ontario Court of 
Appeal and Supreme Court of Canada judge, was one of the earliest and most prominent 
proponents of this view. See W. Laird Hunter, "Bora Laskin and Labour Law: The Formative 
Years," Supreme Court Law Review, 6 (1984), 431-66. More generally, see H. W. Arthurs, 
"Developing Industrial Citizenship: A Challenge for Canada's Second Century," Canadian 
Bar Review, 45 (1967), 786-830; Task Force on Labour Relations, Canadian Industrial 
Relations: Final Report (Ottawa 1968). 
254 LABOUR/LE TRAVAIL 
fundamentally different regime in which workers enjoyed the benefits of industrial 
citizenship. By contrast, we argue that collective bargaining expanded selectively 
and that most workers relied on individual contracts and minimum standards for 
the determination of their working conditions. Moreover, it was not simply the case 
that there was a plurality of institutions for the determination of conditions, but that 
the contours of labour market fragmentation significantly affected workers' access 
to the regime's various components. 
Canada's highly regionalized political economy is one important source of 
fragmentation. Another is its complicated and decentralized political geography 
that divides state power between national, provincial, and local authorities. A third 
dimension of fragmentation is captured by labour market segmentation theory, 
which identifies primary and secondary labour markets and emphasizes ascribed 
characteristics such as gender and race, and institutional factors, such as state 
policies and union structures and practices, as determinants of where workers are 
likely to be located. Workers in primary labour markets are employed by large 
employers, partially shielded from competition, where collective bargaining has 
taken hold to produce conditions of employment that are comparatively good, while 
those in secondary markets are employed in more marginal and competitive sectors 
of the economy, where unionization rates are iow, jobs lack security, and pay is 
6 
poor, 
Although fragmented labour markets sometimes appear to be "natural" cate-
gories arising from "objective" differences, they are socially constructed. While 
these processes are complex, involving both structure and agency, we hope to show 
the salience of law as an instrument and an ideology through which fragmentation 
is institutionalized, reinforced, and contested by the actions of employers and 
workers. We hope also to demonstrate that an examination of the history of 
employment law as an instrument of fragmentation captures some of its most 
important features and dynamics in 20th-century Canada and illuminates the 
relations between its different components. 
To capture the continuities and dynamics of the legal regime, we have divided 
the century into two periods that allow us to amplify and capture some of the most 
significant changes in the patterns of legal regime institutionalization. We have 
labelled the period from 1900 to 1948 as "industrial voluntarism" in order to capture 
its central characteristic: the overwhelming predominance of legal norms associ-
ated with market regulation, subject to a marginal role for state intervention through 
limited compulsory conciliation and direct regulation only for the most vulnerable. 
We have adopted the more conventional term "industrial pluralism" to identify the 
Peter B. Doeringer and Michael J. Piore, Internal Labor Markets and Manpower Analysis, 
2nd ed. (Lexington 1985); David Gordon, Richard Edwards, andMichael Reich, Segmented 
Work, Divided Workers: The Historical Transformation of Workers in the United States 
(Cambridge 1982); Barbara L. Marshall, Engendering Modernity: Feminism, Social Theory 
and Social Change (Cambridge 1994). 
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second period, from 1948 to 2000 to recognize that the era following World War 
II signals the legal institutionalization of workers' collective institutions and the 
simultaneous growth of direct state regulation of the terms of the employment 
contract as a subordinate mechanism to collective bargaining. It also marks the 
development of an industrial jurisprudence and a conception of industrial democ-
racy to replace the hegemony of contract law as the organizing principle of 
employment. 
II. Industrial Voluntarism, 1900-48 
Constructing the Regime of Industrial Voluntarism, 1900-1914 
At the turn of the century, the transition from competitive to monopoly capitalism 
profoundly altered class relations. The National Policy promoted the expansion of 
manufacturing capacity and resource exploitation, both of which depended upon 
an infusion of foreign capital and immigrant workers. The benefits of this unprece-
dented economic growth, however, were not enjoyed equally. Between 1900 and 
the outbreak of World War I, productivity and prices soared, but wages lagged 
behind as working people struggled unsuccessfully to keep up with inflation. 
They were hampered in their efforts by increasing class fragmentation. The 
sexual division of labour both between and within the household and workplace 
was deeply entrenched, even as women's employment increased. In general, 
women's wages were roughly 40 to 60 per cent of men's. Ethnic and racial 
fragmentation grew in significance as different immigrant groups were recruited 
by employers to perform specific types of labour. The skilled crafts were composed 
almost exclusively of workers of Anglo-Saxon descent who, through their unions, 
pursued policies of ethnic and racial exclusion and advocated immigration restric-
tions. Craft unions exercised some control over the labour process in the early years 
of the century and extracted a share of the benefits of economic prosperity. 
Unskilled workers who made up the majority of the country's labour force, 
however, were not strategically placed in the production process and lacked the 
organizational resources to win improved wages and conditions.8 
7Bryan D. Palmer, Working-Class Experience, 2nd cd., (Toronto 1992), ch. 4; Paul Craven, 
"An Impartial Umpire": Industrial Relations and the Canadian State, 1900-1911 (Toronto 
1980), ch. 4; Donald Avery, Reluctant Host: Canada's Response to Immigrant Workers, 
1869-1994 (Toronto 1995), ch. 1; Terry Copp, The Anatomy of Poverty: The Condition of 
the Working Class in Montreal, 1879 - 1929 (Toronto 1974), ch. 2; Michael J. Piva, The 
Condition of the Working Class in Toronto - 1900-1921 (Ottawa 1979), ch.2; Mary 
MacKinnon, "New Evidence on Canadian Wage Rates, 1900-1930," Canadian Journal of 
Economics, 39 (1996), 115-31. 
Wayne Roberts, Honest Womanhood: Feminism, Femininity and Class Consciousness 
among Toronto Working Women, 1893-1914 (Toronto 1976); Marie Campbell, "Sexism in 
British Columbia Trade Unions, 1900-1920," in Barbara Latham and Cathy Kess, eds., In 
Her Own Right: Selected Essays on Women 's History in BC (Victoria 1980), 167- 186; 
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The turn of the century was marked by a major strike wave in Canada, much 
of it led by skilled workers resisting their employers' efforts to carry through a 
second industrial revolution. But industrial action was not confined to this relatively 
privileged segment of the workforce; semi-and unskilled workers in the resource 
industries and on the public infrastructure frequently confronted their employers 
en masse to protest against their poor wages, dangerous working conditions and 
unsanitary habitation. Mass industrial unrest also erupted in Canadian cities, which 
grew at an astonishing rate during the first decade and a half of the century. 
There were two prongs to the state's response to this strike wave. First, there 
was a refinement of the instruments of coercion. Some of this was accomplished 
in the courts where the judiciary held trade unionists civilly liable to employers for 
damages caused by various strike activities. Picketing was narrowly limited to 
protect employer property rights and the right of employers and non-striking 
workers to contract freely. This development in civil law was closely associated 
with the judicial interpretation of the criminal law of watching and besetting. Most 
judges were not prepared to hold that peaceful picketing per se was criminal, 
however, acts such as calling non-striking workers "scabs" attracted criminal 
sanction. Employers also used the law to limit broader manifestations of working-
class solidarity. Secondary action such as organized consumer boycotts and refusals 
by workers to handle struck work were held to be civil conspiracies to injure. 
Adequate remedies were needed to make these civil actions effective. Proce-
dural rules expedited employer applications for injunctions that prohibited the 
unlawful conduct under threat of punishment. There was also much litigation over 
whether a union as an entity could be made financially responsible for the wrongful 
acts of its members. The situation was not always entirely clear, but the general 
view was that while a union could not be sued directly in its own name, its funds 
could be reached through a representative action against the union's officers. 
In sum, the courts further institutionalized a market-based conception of 
justice, which constructed workers and employers as juridically equal, rights-
bearing subjects. The selection of rights, however, was far from neutral. Priority 
was given to rights of property and contract, rights that were quintessentially 
negative, aiming to protect the individual against interference. Their protection 
entailed the imposition of limitations on the positive freedom of workers to engage 
in collective action to advance their interests. Workers recognized the class bias of 
Mercedes Stecdman, Angels of the Workplace: Women and the Construction of Gender 
Relations in the Canadian Clothing Industry, 1890 -1940 (Toronto 1993); Linda Kealey, 
Enlisting Women for the Cause: Women, Labour and the Left in Canada, 1890 - 1920 
Toronto 1998). 
Eric Tucker and Judy Fudge, "Forging Responsible Unions: Metal Workers and the Rise 
of the Labour Injunction in Canada," LabourJLe Travail, 37 (Spring 1996), 81-120. 
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the courts but were unable to mobilize enough political support for legislation 
overriding these decisions, except in British Columbia. ° 
Although these legal principles applied to all labour market actors, craft 
workers were most subjected to them. Not only were their tactics more amenable 
to legal controls, but because these workers established permanent organizations, 
legal actions that threatened their assets could be particularly effective. While other 
workers did not experience directly the sting of judge-made law, it still affected 
them. Judicial pronouncements on the realm of permissible trade-union activity 
were important not only for their immediate legal consequences; they also aided in 
constructing a normative framework that legitimated other state actions, at least in 
the eyes of those who were inclined to believe law's words. The-legal charac-
terization of behaviour as wrongful or criminal provided a justification for govern-
ment officials to deploy police or militia to restore the judicially endorsed view of 
public order.1 
The deployment of direct state coercion was highly uneven in the pre-war 
period. Most craft unions could operate more or less successfully within the 
confines of the law and avoid confrontation with police authority. The situation of 
semi-skilled industrial workers was more difficult. They often confronted employ-
ers determined to resist unionization and frequently lacked the organizational 
strength to overcome that resistance. Faced with the threat of replacements, these 
workers resorted to more muscular tactics. In smaller communities, local police 
sometimes lacked the capacity or the will to defend employers' rights of property 
and contract to the extent employers demanded. In some regions, powerful employ-
ers could rely on economically dependent provincial governments for coercive 
assistance. Moreover, since many of the industrial unions espoused radical ideas 
and welcomed immigrant workers into their ranks, this made them dangerous in 
the eyes of employers and state officials, justifying close surveillance and, ulti-
mately, direct coercion, including the deployment of the militia, police raids, 
prosecutions, and deportations. Dangerous foreigners and subversives, unlike 
respectful working men, could not count upon the strain of mercy in British 
justice.12 
The second prong of the state's response aimed to promote conciliation and 
accommodation between employers and responsible unions as a strategy for 
For a fruitful application of the distinction between positive and negative freedoms in the 
labour context, sec Jacoby, Laboring for Freedom. On the BC legislation, sec A.W.R. 
Carrothers, "A Legislative History of the B.C. Trade-Unions Act: The Rossland Miners' 
Case," U.B.C Legal Notes, 2 (1956), 339-46. 
Douglas Hay, "Time, Inequality, and Law's Violence," in Austin Sarat and Thomas R. 
Kcams, eds., Law's Violence (Ann Arbor 1992), 141-73. 
12 
Greg Marquis, "Doing Justice to 'British Justice': Law, Ideology and Canadian Histori-
ography," in W. Wesley Pue and Barry Wright, eds., Canadian Perspectives on Law and 
Society: Issues in Law and History (Ottawa 1988), 43-69; Mark Leicr, Where the Fraser 
River Flows: The Industrial Workers of the World in British Columbia (Vancouver 1990). 
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reducing industrial conflict. To qualify for this treatment, unions had to demonstrate 
their support for the judicially constructed regime of industrial legality by not 
violating rights of property and contract or engaging in secondary actions such as 
sympathetic strikes or boycotts. To this end, the federal government began devel-
oping a legislative framework and an institutional infrastructure that enabled state 
officials to facilitate the settlement of disputes with a minimum of disruption. 
Industrial conflict that interfered with the success of its National Policy was 
particularly troubling and so the federal government's efforts focused on public 
utilities, defined to include mines, transportation, communications, and gas, elec-
tric, and power works. It claimed constitutional authority to legislate in tJiese areas 
on the basis of its residual "peace, order and good government" powers.13 
In 1900, the Laurier government established a Department of Labour which 
published the Labour Gazette (the official organ of labour relations information), 
and administered the newly enacted Conciliation Act. Mackenzie King was the 
department's chief bureaucrat and he shaped the government's labour policy over 
the coming years. The Conciliation Act (1900) provided the first general legal 
framework for federal intervention in labour disputes. It authorized the Minister to 
investigate a dispute and arrange a conference between the parties. As well, either 
party could request conciliation, however, there was no legal obligation to, partici-
pate. The scheme's implementation tended to reflect King's personal predilections. 
His primary concern was to restore production on the basis of market conditions, 
rather than to advance some other idea of economic justice. Thus, the government's 
policies rested firmly within the realm of "voluntarism," 
Federal conciliation proved to be ineffective in resolving railway and mining 
strikes where recognition issues often loomed large. But even the potentially serious 
consequences of railway strikes to the national economy could not persuade the 
federal government to compel recognition or impose compulsory arbitration. 
Instead, the Railway Labour Disputes Act (1903) provided that conciliation could 
be followed by non-binding arbitration by an ad hoc tripartite board authorized to 
conduct a quasi-judicial investigation (including the power to compel testimony 
and order the production of documents) and to issue a normative report recommend-
ing terms of settlement. „ 
Although little used, this legislation was an important precedent when Mack-
enzie King decided, after a series of particularly bitter and hard-fought strikes 
involving intervention by the militia, that stronger legislation was required to 
contain industrial conflict. The 1907 Industrial Dispute Investigation Act (IDIA) 
not only incorporated the use of tripartite conciliation boards, but prohibited resort 
to industrial action prior to the completion of the board's work. Persons who 
13 
Craven, "An Impartial Umpire "; Bob Russell, Back to Work? Labour, State and Industrial 
Relations In Canada (Scarborough 1990), ch. 3; Jeremy Webber, "Compelling Compro-
mise: Canada Chooses Conciliation over Arbitration, 1900-1907," Labour/Le Travail, 28 
(1991), J 5-54. 
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violated the prohibition were liable to be prosecuted under the Criminal Code, 
although they rarely were. Conciliation was compulsory with respect to public 
utilities, but could be invoked by the mutual agreement of any disputants. It was 
hoped that delay and investigation would encourage the parties to accept the boards ' 
recommendations which would be supported by enlightened public opinion. Gov-
ernment imposition of terms and conditions was still not accepted as a legitimate 
alternative to market voluntarism.l4 
The instrumental impact of the IDIA on those workers covered by its manda-
tory provisions was equivocal prior to World War I. Workers were most successful 
when they could force negotiations without state intervention; resort to IDIA 
conciliation was a second-best strategy. But it was also intended that the IDIA 
would have an ideological impact through the production by conciliation boards of 
a template of legitimate demands and acceptable conduct, publicized through the 
Labour Gazette. Boards generally accepted that workers should be entitled to a 
living wage, subject to the employer's ability to pay, and to be free to join a trade 
union without suffering discrimination, while employers should be free to manage 
their enterprises and maintain an open shop. On the issue of recognition, concili-
ation boards generally supported negotiation with employee committees when 
employers refused to deal with trade union representatives. This normative frame-
work did not, however, gain widespread'acceptance either among unions or 
employers. At best, there was pragmatic acceptance depending on the balance of 
power, but the practice of conciliation did not alter that balance.15 
The simultaneous expansion of the state's power to coerce and to conciliate 
produced a regime of industrial legality that was both more powerful and more 
flexible than before. While the incremental increase in coercive power was more 
significant than the increase in conciliation, this dual development enabled the 
government more finely to calibrate the regime so that it could support the 
development of responsible trade unionism (understood to refer to unions that 
agreed to operate within the narrow confines of a market-based model of industrial 
legality) and impede more radical manifestations of working-class solidarity that 
challenged capitalist relations of production. The primary beneficiaries of this 
regime were craft unions which represented a small fragment of the labour market 
that was predominantly male and Anglo. Semi-skilled and especially ethnic and 
racialized workers were most likely to be the targets of the coercive side of state 
power. 
14W. M. Baker, "The Miners and the Mediator: The 1906 Lethbridge Strike and Mackenzie 
King," Labour/Le Travail, 11 (1983), 89-117. 
Ben M. Selekman, Postponing Strikes (New York 1927); Jeremy Webber, "The Mediation 
of Ideology: How Conciliation Boards, Through the Mediation of Particular Disputes, 
Fashioned a Vision of Labour's Place within Canadian Society," Law in Context, 7,2 (1989), 
1-23. 
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State support for the cenlrality of market mechanisms in the determination of 
conditions of employment was also reflected in the modest changes to minimum 
standards legislation during this period. One apparent exception was hazardous 
working conditions which increasingly came to be regulated by provincial statutes. 
These laws also continued to limit hours of work for women and young adults and 
to prohibit the employment of children. As in the past though, the effect of these 
interventions was limited by weak enforcement and the predominant view that 
enlightened profit-seeking employers would discover that meeting the legislative 
requirements was in their economic self interest. In part, this was true because 
inspectors were loath to require employers to adopt measures that were uneconom-
ical. As a result, divergence between state-established minimum standards and 
market outcomes was minimized. As well, household and agricultural workers were 
still denied any legislative protection, reflecting the continued unwillingness of the 
state to intervene in the domestic sphere, even when relationships within it were 
established and governed through contracts of employment. 
Compensation for work-related injuries, diseases, and fatalities was also 
contentious. Common law judges had constructed a legal presumption that workers 
voluntarily assumed the risk of being injured by hazards present in the workplace 
in exchange for their wages. This kind of market justice was unacceptable to 
workers and was legislatively modified in the 19th century, but these reforms still 
made the receipt of compensation dependent either on workers bargaining for 
disability insurance or proving in court that employer negligence caused their 
injuries. Workers continued to demand compensation for their injuries as a matter 
of justice and employers were unhappy with a system that required them to purchase 
private insurance, produced litigation conducted by insurance carriers to protect 
their own interests, and left employees disgruntled. A no-fault system of public 
insurance offered employers predictability and the de*politicization of work inju-
ries by making them a routine cost of production for which no blame was assigned, 
For workers, it provided secure compensation. Despite serious disagreements about 
the terms on which compensation would be awarded and the administration of the 
scheme, there was enough common ground and political support to establish 
no-fault, state-administered workers' compensation systems in most provinces, 
beginning with Ontario in 1914.! ? 
As with other minimum standards, though, workers' compensation was care-
fully tailored to minimize its interference with the market and the normative family. 
Compensation was set as a percentage of earnings (initially 55 per cent), without 
Eric Tucker, Administering Danger in the Workplace (Toronto 1990). 
I7R.C.B. Risk, '"This Nuisance of Litigation': The Origins of Workers' Compensation in 
Ontario," in D.H. Flaherty, éd., Essays in the History of Canadian Law, Vol. II (Toronto 
1983), 418-91. Other provinces enacted legislation as follows: Nova Scotia (1915); British 
Columbia and Manitoba ( 1916); Alberta and New Brunswick ( 1918); Saskatchewan ( 1928); 
Québec (1931); P.E.I. (1949); and Newfoundland (1950). 
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any guarantee of a minimum payment that would keep low wage earners and their 
dependent families out of dire poverty. Widows, even those with dependent 
children, lost their pension if they re-married and widowers were only entitled to a 
pension if they were incapable of working. As well, domestic and agricultural 
workers were typically excluded. 
There was little other protective legislation. Trade unions supported legislated 
limits on the length of the working day, but only in British Columbia, where 
labour-supported MLA's sometimes held the balance of power in a particularly 
fractious legislature, were eight-hour laws passed for underground miners, station-
ary engineers employed in metal mines, and smelter workers. Progress was aided 
by the health and safety dimension of the issue. The problem of low-wages for 
women, and more generally, for all workers who lacked bargaining power, was not 
addressed legislatively in any province, although some governments promulgated 
fair wage resolutions that secured workers on government contracts prevailing local 
wage levels. 
If special protection for women was a double-edged sword because it helped 
reproduce labour market discrimination by entrenching ideas about women's 
greater physical and moral vulnerability in the workplace, legislative restrictions 
aimed at Asian workers did not in any way purport to be for their benefit. Rather, 
these were motivated by a combination of white workers' fear about unfair wage 
competition and racist beliefs. Legislation restricting the employment of Asian 
workers was most common in British Columbia, the province with the greatest 
Asian population. Nineteenth-century statutes banned Chinese and Japanese from 
underground mining, but from 1899 onwards such laws were either struck down 
by the courts or disallowed by the Federal government because they interfered with 
the importation of Asian labour to build the railways and supply the CPR with coal 
and ran afoul of imperial British policy. A more widespread brand of anti-Asian 
legislation, ostensibly aimed to protect white women workers from the depreda-
tions of Asian employers, passed constitutional muster." 
In sum, the legal regulation of employment in this period tended to constitute 
and reinforce a market-based model of wage determination in which individual 
rights of property and contract took priority over the freedom of workers to act 
collectively. Responsible trade unions that agreed to operate within the narrow 
! BHarold Fabian Underhill, "Labor Legislation in British Columbia," PhD Thesis, University 
of California, 1935, 97-106; Linda Kealey, Enlisting Women, 29-37; Robert Mcintosh, 
"Sweated Labour: Female Meedleworkers in Industrializing Canada," Labour/Le Travail, 
32(1993), 105-38. 
! Ross Lambertson, "After Union Colliery: Law, Race, and Class in the Coalmines of British 
Columbia," in Hamar Foster and John McLaren, eds., Essays in the History of Canadian 
Law, Vol. VI, British Columbia and the Yukon (Toronto 1995), 386-422; Constance Back-
house, "The White Women's Labor Law: Anti-Chinese Racism in Early Twentieth-Century 
Canada," Law & History Review, 14 (1996), 315-68. 
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confines of industrial legality could be accommodated within this regime, but not 
those who insisted on challenging the legally constituted rules of engagement. The 
male and largely Anglo craft fragment of the labour force was more likely to fall 
in the first category and the much larger industrial fragment into the second. It was 
only when market outcomes potentially outraged public standards of decency that 
the state evinced any willingness to impose minimum standards, particularly when 
paternalist values protecting honest womanhood and the normative family were at 
stake, or when racialized workers were constructed as the source of danger. But 
even then, protective legislation or, for that matter, legislation discriminating 
against racialized workers, was rarely allowed to impede important economic 
interests. 
World War I Labour Policy, 1914-1918 
World War I set in motion a chain of events that challenged the regime of industrial 
voluntarism, including its underlying gender order. Fuelled by tight labour markets, 
high inflation, and a growing sense of entitlement encouraged by political leaders' 
claim that this was a war for democracy, workers became increasingly radicalized 
and militant. The ensuing workers' revolt tested the limits of the legal framework 
and judges and politicians worked together to defend it. Some state officials, 
however, were convinced that a new regime was required to accommodate the 
legitimate demands of working men and women, and they took steps to better 
institutionalize collective bargaining and strengthen minimum standards (espe-
cially for women). Employers resisted these measures and were able to defeat or 
limit severely many of these initiatives. As a result, although the war and immediate 
post-war agitation left some imprint on the regime of industrial voluntarism, it 
survived largely intact for die remainder of the 1920s.2" 
The War Measures Act centralized power in the federal cabinet, allowing it to 
rule by order in council. Initially, the government's labour policy relied on the 
existing regime to maintain war production. It extended the 1D1A to all war 
industries in 1916, despite the opposition of the dominant labour federation, the 
Trades and Labour Congress (TLC), which favoured the adoption of a fair wages 
policy. As the war progressed, however, these tools to contain rising labour 
militancy failed, and the Federal government experimented with a variety of 
21 
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There were some attempts to accommodate the demands of responsible unions 
and better institutionalize collective bargaining with them. For example, state 
intervention prevented coal strikes in Nova Scotia by helping to secure an agree-
ment that included union recognition and a dues check-off. On the railways, the 
government pressured the parties to establish a scheme of consensual, binding 
interest arbitration. As well, it actively sought a rapprochement with the TLC 
leadership in the hope that its more responsible leaders would help to contain the 
rising conflict. In January, 1917, Gideon Robertson, an officer with the railway 
telegraphers' union, was appointed to Senate and to Cabinet as a minister without 
portfolio with responsibility for labour matters. Trade union representatives were 
subsequently appointed to various government councils and commissions. Many 
provinces also took a slight corporatist turn, creating or expanding labour bureaux 
or departments.2 
More militant unions and labour radicals faced a more coercive response, 
especially after the 1917 Bolshevik revolution. The state security apparatus was 
strengthened and it cracked-down on lww agitators and other "undesirable," often 
foreign-bom, radicals. In April 1918, the government issued PC 815 that made it an 
offence for an adult male not to be "regularly engaged in a useful occupation," and 
PC 915 that further restricted public expression of anti-war sentiment. 
•" Still, the government's primary response to labour unrest remained concili-
atory. Indeed, that summer, the government issued PC 1743, a declaration of its war 
labour policy, which recognized the right of workers to join a union without 
employer interference or retaliation; supported the maintenance of union shops 
established by agreement; and endorsed the idea that all workers were entitled to a 
living wage sufficient to support themselves and their families in decency and 
comfort. In exchange, it called for no strikes or lockouts for the duration of the war 
and respect for the right of individual workers to refrain from joining a union. This 
order, however, was merely declaratory of the government's policy; no steps were 
taken to implement it. 
Only in the very last days of the war did federal labour policy veer sharply 
towards coercion. In September 1918, the government issued orders banning enemy 
language publications and proscribing unlawful associations, and finally, in Octo-
ber, it banned strikes and lock-outs for the duration of the war. The signing of the 
armistice the following month, however, largely avoided the need for the govern-
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ment to resolve how it would enforce the ban, and, in general, left open the question 
of whether the government could successfully operate a dual labour policy which 
simultaneously promoted the institutionalization of responsible unionism and 
repressed labour radicalism. 
The war also challenged the gender order of the second industrial revolution 
in which families' access to the means of survival was primarily through a male 
wage, and in which female wage earners were restricted to a limited number of 
lower paying jobs. Conscription deprived many families of their breadwinners and 
the ensuing labour shortage also drew some women into men's jobs. This situation 
raised in a particularly sharp manner the dual problem of low female wages; they 
were insufficient to support a household and undercut men's wages. 
One means of minimizing downward pressure on male wages was to promote 
equal pay for women doing work ordinarily performed by men. The government 
formally embraced the principle in PC 1743, but most employers resisted the 
practice. The problem of low wages for the mass of women employed in women's 
jobs began to be addressed in 1917 by provincial female minimum wage legislation. 
Minimum wage boards were empowered to set female wages on an occupational 
basis, but instead of adopting an egalitarian approach, they took a protective one 
which, at best, provided working women with the bare minimum needed to 
reproduce their own labour. This idea of the minimum contrasted sharply with the 
"fair" or "living" wage principle that was embraced by ID1A boards and the federal 
and some provincial governments in their contracting practices. As a result, with 
the end of the war, fragmented labour markets reasserted themselves and women 
were once again confined to low wage work, even while the principle of state-es-
tablished minimum standards for especially vulnerable labour force participants 
was further entrenched. 
The Defeat of the Post- War Workers ' Revolt, 191S-1929 
The end of the war did not bring labour peace but heightened conflict. Workers 
sought to obtain more democracy and prosperity at home, having sacrificed to 
protect it abroad, while employers sought to restore the status quo ante, having 
made concessions under the pressure of tight labour markets and government 
pressure to maintain war production. The Federal government stood between labour 
and capital, but was not a neutral umpire. Its primary objective was to maintain 
social order and economic growth within a capitalist framework. As before, this 
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required a mixture of conciliation and coercion, although disagreement emerged 
over the appropriate blend. 
In the immediate aftermath of the Armistice, the government continued both 
to construct an accord between responsible unions and employers and to contain 
manifestations of political and labour radicalism. Prime Minister Borden played an 
active role in drafting the labour sections of the Treaty of Versailles that established 
the International Labour Organization (ILO) and endorsed the principle of workers' 
freedom of association. The government also appointed the Royal Commission on 
Industrial Relations (RCIR) to inquire into means of improving relations between 
employers and workers. At the same time, however, it introduced amendments to 
the Immigration Act expanding its powers to prohibit radicals from entering the 
country and making it easier to deport them. It also embarked on the process of 
amending the Criminal Code to broaden the definition of sedition and ban unlawful 
associations. 
Labour conflict reached unprecedented levels in the spring of 1919, much of 
it led by radicalized workers who split from the more conservative TLC to join the 
One Big Union (OBU). While the revolt was national in its dimensions, the centre 
of conflict was in Winnipeg where a general strike of some 30,000 workers began 
on 15 May and lasted until 26 June. The Federal government was determined that 
thé strike must fail and it worked closely with the local bourgeoisie to achieve that 
result. After it became apparent that the strike would not collapse on its own accord, 
police arrested strike leaders. The British-bom were charged with seditious con-
spiracy while the foreign-bom were dealt with under the Immigration Act with the 
expectation that they would be deported. Following the arrests, strike supporters 
held a rally in defiance of a ban on public demonstrations and, after the crowd failed 
to disperse, police opened fire, killing two men and wounding many others.2 
After the strike's defeat, the criminal trials of the British-born strike leaders 
became a cause célèbre. A judge sympathetic to the prosecution presided and most 
of the leaders were convicted and sentenced to terms of imprisonment that ranged 
from six months to two years. Ironically, the 'forcign'-born leaders fared better in 
25 
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administrative proceedings: only one was ultimately deported and the rest were set 
free. Some of the less prominent aliens, however, were secretly deported.2 
Significant outbursts of radicalism in other parts of the country also met with 
extraordinary assertions of state power. For example, in the Alberta coalfields, 
where there was an OBU breakaway from the more conservative United Minework-
ers of America (UMWA), the state-appointed director of coal operations made a 
closed shop agreement between the UMWA and the coal operators legally enforce-
able. When the legality of the order was questioned, the federal government 
retroactively ratified it by statute. Meanwhile, in Nova Scotia, J.B. MacLachlan, 
leader of a radicalized local district of the UMWA, was convicted of seditious libel 
and sentenced to two years imprisonment.28 
The exercise of coercive force to defeat the post-war labour revolt was not 
accompanied by an abandonment of the state's efforts to institutionalize an accord 
between responsible unions and employers. However, the overwhelming majority 
of employers had no interest in pursuing 3 partnership with organized labour, even 
if unions behaved responsibly. They preferred neo-paternalist employee repre-
sentation schemes that excluded independent unions. Because the government was 
reluctant to compel unwilling employers to accept independent trade unions, its 
efforts at a rapprochement collapsed. The election of the Liberals in 1921, led by 
Mackenzie King, the architect of pre-war industrial voluntarism, ended the federal 
government's attempt to construct a new national labour relations policy.29 
The institutional and ideological reconstruction of the labour market as local 
and consensual ultimately had constitutional significance. Under the constitution, 
provinces had jurisdiction over property and civil rights, while the federal govem-
Tom Mitchell, '"Repressive Measures': A.J. Andrews, the Committee of 1000 and the 
Campaign Against Radicalism After the Winnipeg General Strike," Left History, 3, 2 and 
4,1 (1996), 133-167; Desmond H. Brown, "The Craftsmanship of Bias: Sedition and the 
Winnipeg Strike Trial, 1919," Manitoba Law Journal, 14(1984), 1-33; Leslie Katz, "Some 
Legal Consequences of the Winnipeg General Strike of 1919," Manitoba Law Journal, 4 
(1970-71), 39-52. 
8Charles Allen Seager, "A Proletariat in Wild Rose Country: The Alberta Coal Miners, 
1905-1945" PhD Thesis, York University, 1981, 316-61 ; Bercuson, Fools and Wise Men, 
136-43; Foy, "Gideon Robertson," 112-17; Frank, "The Cape Breton Coal Miners," and 
"The Trial of J.B. McLachlan," CHA Historical Papers, (1983), 208-25; John Manley, 
"Preaching the Red Stuff: J.B. McLachlan, Communism, and the Cape Breton Miners, 
1922-1935," iMbour/Le Travail, 30 (1992), 65-114; Barry Cahill, "Howe (1835), Dixon 
(1920) and McLachlan (1923): Comparative Perspectives on the Legal History of Sedition," 
University of New Brunswick Law Journal, 45 (1995), 281-307. 
Royal Commission on Industrial Relations, "Report of Commission" (Ottawa: Supple-
ment to Labour Gazette, July 1919); Larry G. Gerber, "The United States and Canadian 
National Industrial Conferences of 1919: A Comparative Analysis," Labor History, 32 
(1991 ), 42-65; Margaret McCallum, "Corporate Welfarism in Canada, 1919-39," Canadian 
Historical Review, 71 (1990), 46-79. 
TWENTIETH CENTURY EMPLOYMENT 267 
ment had authority over national trade and commerce, criminal law and peace, 
order, and good government. A challenge to the constitutionality of the IDIA in the 
midst of the 1913 strike wave failed when the court held that the act was "not 
legislation affecting private or civil rights" but rather protected the broad public 
interest in peace, order, and good government. When the IDIA was challenged after 
the war, most Canadian judges agreed with this view. However, the Privy Council 
of the House of Lords, the final court of appeal, disagreed. It held that labour 
relations was a matter of property and civil rights, thereby sharply curtailing federal 
jurisdiction. Although this was not the result that King's government desired, it was 
not radically inconsistent with the prevailing Liberal view about the limited role of 
the national government.30 
The decentralization of labour law and policy allowed for more localized 
responses to particular conditions, but in practice little changed. The old coercive 
infrastructure of voluntarism (justified as the protection of individual rights of 
property and contract) remained in force and continued to be applied with particular 
vigour against the few militant unions that survived the immediate post-war defeats. 
In Nova Scotia, for example, local officials requisitioned troops during strikes by 
Cape Breton coal miners and steel workers in 1922, 1923, and 1925. Labour 
injunctions also became more common as many judges held that it was necessary 
to curb picketing in order to protect the rights of employers, individual employees, 
and members of the public. These limitations on picketing remained imprecise and 
different judges held competing views on the question. Still, the threat of liability 
was ever-present, even for responsible unions, and the TLC lobbied unsuccessfully 
for legislation that would unambiguously permit peaceful picketing and limit trade 
union liability for damages arising out of strike-related activity.3' 
Provinces did not enthusiastically embrace their new jurisdiction. Instead, 
most took advantage of federal legislation that enabled them to make the IDIA apply 
to mining, railway, and public utility disputes within their jurisdiction. The only 
legal innovations were in Nova Scotia and Québec, where concessions were made 
in order to promote more conservative unions and avoid incursions by less desirable 
ones. In Nova Scotia, where the UMWA was fighting off the communist-influenced 
Mine Workers Union of Canada (MWUC), the Coal Mine Regulation Act was 
amended in 1927 to make union dues deductions mandatory when requested in 
writing by an employee. This was subsequently used by the UMWA to enforce closed 
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shop agreements against MWUC members. In Québec, a Catholic trade union 
movement emerged that was committed to the church's social teachings which 
emphasized cooperative relations between workers and employers. The Profes-
sional Syndicates Act passed in 1924 permitted workers to form incorporated 
associations that were able to enforce collective agreements and shield their benefit 
funds from seizure by employers seeking to enforce damage awards. While the Act 
did not directly limit participation in the scheme to Catholic unions, it did so 
indirectly by requiring that to incorporate all directors had to be British subjects 
and that foreigners could only constitute up to one-third of the membership. This 
clearly disqualified international unions which were, in any event, ideologically 
opposed to incorporation, seeing it as a means of subjecting them to more extensive 
legal control. The provincial government's support for Catholic unions, however, 
only went so far. There was nothing in the scheme that compelled employers to 
recognize or bargain with incorporated unions.32 
Overall, the coercive infrastructure of the post-war regime of industrial volun-
tarism applied to all workers, although its enforcement varied considerably. Con-
ciliatory law was far more fragmented. The coverage of the 1DIA was patchy, 
provincial trade dispute legislation was purely voluntary, and the frequency and 
effectiveness of ad hoc interventions by state officials varied enormously. Given 
this legal regime, the level of employer resistance, and the weakness of Canadian 
unions, collective bargaining in the 1920s was confined to à small segment of the 
labour market, benefiting a minority of mostly male, mostly Anglo workers. 
For the majority, there were few minimum standards to protect against unfa-
vourable labour market conditions and discriminatory practices. Provincial female 
minimum wage laws typically covered women employed in factories, shops and 
offices, but excluded those in rural areas and domestic service. The boards that 
administered these laws did not challenge labour market discrimination that denied 
most women access to "fair" or equal wages. Moreover, these laws also reinforced 
industrial and sectoral fragmentation. Instead of setting a flat rate, the boards set 
different rates for different industries, taking into account specific business condi-
tions. In addition, further rate distinctions were based on age and experience. In 
sum, the boards' practices reinforced labour market fragmentation.33 
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Wage inequality was not the only legally countenanced form of sex discrimi-
nation; governments also supported the re-entrenchment of labour market segrega-
tion in the post-war reconstruction period. For example, a veterans' preference 
clause was inserted into the federal government's Civil Service Act in 1918 and, in 
1921, during a period of high unemployment, formal restrictions were placed on 
the employment of married women. In practice, these laws did not exclude women 
from the federal civil service, but they helped channel' them into poorly paid 
occupational ghettoes.34 
British Columbia, was the only province that legislated maximum hours of 
work and minimum wages for men. Eight-hour laws had been passed in the pre-war 
era for underground miners and some related employees, but it was only in 1923, 
largely in response to fear of unfair wage competition from workers of Asian origin, 
that a law of more general application was enacted, covering mining, manufactur-
ing, and construction. This was followed in 1925 by the passage of male minimum 
wage legislation that, again, was largely driven by anti-Asian sentiment. Employers 
challenged the law and convinced a court that it required wages be set job by job, 
not by occupation. This rendered the statute completely ineffective.35 
The Final Crises of Industrial Voluntarism, 1929-45 
The social and labour market disruptions resulting from the Great Depression and 
World War H undermined the foundation upon which industrial voluntarism was 
reconstructed in the post-World War I era. Several strike waves and political and 
ideological realignments produced a qualitatively different regime (commonly 
known as industrial pluralism), albeit one that bore the imprint of its predecessor 
and the struggles that marked its demise. Although these crises created the possi-
bility of producing a less fragmented legal regime, in the end fragmentation 
increased, enhancing gaps between differently situated workers. 
At the height of the Great Depression nearly one quarter of the labour force 
was unemployed and double-digit unemployment persisted for the remainder of the 
decade. Many of those lucky enough to be employed faced declining standards of 
living, as neither trade unions nor minimum standards laws were strong enough to 
protect workers from the downward pressure on wages. The state's response to the 
resulting human suffering, especially in the first and most critical years, was grossly 
inadequate. Federal relief failed to meet the needs of families, and single unem-
ployed women and men were commonly denied relief altogether. 
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In this climate, radicalism flourished, among the employed, who resisted 
immiseration, and the unemployed, especially single men who were uprooted from 
their communities and later funnelled into relief camps established by the federal 
government. The Communist Party played a particularly active role in organizing 
both groups through the Workers' Unity League (WUL) and the Relief Camp 
Workers' Union (RCWU). The state responded with increased surveillance and 
repression. Leaders of the party were arrested in 1931 and convicted under the 
infamous section 98 for being members of an illegal organization. Strikes by 
WUL-affiliated unions in Anyox, British Columbia, Estevan, Saskatchewan, Flin 
Flon, Manitoba, Stratford, Ontario, and Rouyn, Québec were defeated by stiff 
employer resistance, bolstered by the armed force of the state and a sympathetic 
judiciary. The bloody police attack in Regina that terminated the 1935 On-to-
Ottawa trek of unemployed workers represented the high point of this coercive 
turn.37 
However much the federal government wanted to blame this unrest on a small 
band of radical agitators, it could not escape the reality of widespread human 
suffering and the sympathy this generated in the broader community. A last minute 
and poorly conceived attempt to launch a Canadian New Deal failed to save the 
federal Conservative government in 1935, but the election of King's Liberals did 
not produce a dramatic change in government policy. 
The absence of a federal New Deal left the field open to the provincial 
governments which were being pressured on many fronts. Politically, the Co-op-
erative Commonwealth Federation (CCP) attracted substantial working-class and 
farmer support, threatening established political parties. As well, unorganized 
industrial workers became increasingly militant and evinced a willingness to violate 
their employers ' legal rights by, for example, occupying factories in support of their 
demands. Many provincial officials also were becoming convinced that low wages 
were part of a vicious cycle of weak demand and excess competition that depressed 
the economy and placed a heavy burden on state coffers. No longer was it a 
vulnerable minority (predominantly female) that needed protection from the vicis-
situdes of the market; the problem was endemic. 
Provincial governments responded to these challenges in a variety of ways. On 
the one hand, governments made it clear that violations of the law would not be 
tolerated and the sit-down movement in Canada was short-lived- As in the past, 
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threats to employers' property and contract rights evoked a strong state response, 
although the Criminal Code was unexpectedly amended in 1934 to restore the right 
to picket peacefully. On the other hand, governments felt pressured to address some 
of the underlying sources of labour discontent. The resulting initiatives varied from 
province to province, depending on local conjunctures of interests and ideologies, 
but essentially they extended trade union rights and minimum standards. This 
entailed departures from the norms of industrial voluntarism by limiting employers' 
freedom of contract and requiring the creation of a larger administrative apparatus. 
Much of the post-1935 strike activity took place under the banner of the newly 
established, American-based, Congress of Industrial Organization (CIO). Trade-un-
ion organizing in the United States was given a shot in the arm by the Wagner Act 
(1935) which prohibited employer interference with trade union organization, 
required employers to recognize and bargain with trade unions that had majority 
support, and created an administrative body vested with the legal authority to 
enforce the scheme. In Canada, however, the craft unions that dominated the TLC 
were wary of that model, fearing that it would support industrial unions at their 
expense. Hence, the TLC refused to campaign for a Canadian version and instead, 
in 1936, drafted a model bill that prohibited various kinds of employer interference 
with the right of workers to join trade unions and bargain collectively. 
In the following years, some version of the TLC bill was passed by nearly every 
province, except Ontario, where Premier Mitch Hepburn's fear and loathing of the 
CIO blocked any such move. This legislation limited employers' freedom of contract 
by, for example, making it a provincial offence, punishable by fine, for employers 
to require that workers agree not to join a trade union as a condition of their 
employment. By 1939, the federal government also became involved and made it 
a crime to refuse to employ a person for the sole reason that the person was a 
member of a lawful trade union formed for the purpose of advancing in a lawful 
manner their interests. 
In some provinces, freedom of association was part of a larger package of 
reforms. For example, Manitoba and New Brunswick also enacted IDIA-type 
legislation that was applicable to provincial labour disputes, white Nova Scotia, 
Alberta, and British Columbia passed stripped-down versions of the Wagner Act. 
Only in Nova Scotia was the law used successfully. Elsewhere it had no impact, in 
part because enforcement was through prosecution in the courts, rather than through 
an administrative tribunal equipped with the remedial power to implement the law 
effectively and efficiently. As a result, prior to World War II collective bargaining 
spread slowly in the mass production industries. 
The most interesting legislative innovation during this period was the enact-
ment of industrial standards acts that conjoined collective bargaining with mini-
mum standards to construct a framework for joint labour-management regulation 
of labour markets capable of resisting downward pressure in intensely competitive 
local markets. Inspired by Roosevelt's National Industrial Recovery Act, such 
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schemes provided that an agreement reached between a group of workers and 
employers within a particular industrial sector and geographic region could become 
binding on all employers and workers in that sector and region even though they 
were not parties to the agreement. The law faci litated collective bargaining in highly 
competitive sectors by assuring employers who saw the benefit of coopération, that 
they would not be disadvantaged by those who did not. Statutes along these lines 
were passed in Québec (1934), Ontario and Alberta (1935), Nova Scotia (1936), 
Saskatchewan (1937), Manitoba (1938), and New Brunswick (1939). Their major 
weakness was that there was no way to compel employers to participate and so 
industrial standards were only established in a few sectors, most notably construc-
tion and some branches of the garment industry, where employers saw a benefit 
from joint regulation. Another problem was that such schemes tended to reinforce 
fragmentation on a gendered basis; the wage schedule that was negotiated in the 
garment industry placed women at the bottom of an artificially constructed, 
gendered hierarchy of skill,38 
The limited gains on the collective bargaining front left the vast majority of 
workers to fend for themselves through their individual contracts of employment. 
For many the result was unacceptably low wages, a consequence that provincial 
governments felt compelled to address not only for electoral reasons but to support 
macro-economic policies aimed at increasing demand, reducing industrial conflict, 
and relieving the strain on welfare budgets. The form of intervention was contested 
though and each province tended to follow a somewhat different path. 
Since many women were already covered by minimum wage laws, in most 
provinces the issue was whether to extend minimum wages to.men and, if so, on 
what basis. A few of the earliest Depression-era minimum standard laws were 
sector specific, including a number directed at the forestry industry. Between 1934 
and 1937, all provinces except Nova Scotia enacted a general male minimum or 
fair wage law. Following the precedent of female minimum wage laws, they did 
not establish a flat rate, but rather empowered administrative bodies to establish 
industry- and geographic-specific minima. Typically, the statutes provided for 
conferences or consultations to be held in an effort to obtain voluntary agreement. 
Absent of an agreement, however, the schemes provided that a schedule of wages 
could be imposed by order. Most of these administrative bodies also were empow-
ered to set maximum hours of work. 
Beyond these basic similarities, the schemes varied considerably. Manitoba 
and Saskatchewan simply extended their female minimum wage laws to men, so 
that there were no differences between the minimum male and female wage rates. 
British Columbia and Alberta enacted separate male minimum wage laws and 
3SSteedman, Angels ofthe Workplace, ch. 7 and "Canada's New Deal in the Needle Trades," 
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issued separate orders that provided for a higher male minimum wage. Ontario 
enacted a consolidated minimum wage law in 1937, but the only order issued by 
the end of the decade set a lower wage rate for women than for men in the textile 
industry. Quebec's fair wage law was the most extensively applied. A general order 
set wages for most categories of work in towns and municipalities, without a 
male/female differential. In rural areas, the earlier female women wage orders were 
adopted and extended to men performing the same duties as women.3 
In sum, the regime of industrial voluntarism and its legitimating ideology 
began to unravel in the face of the social, economic, and political disorder caused 
by the Great Depression, leading to an expanded role for the state in regulating 
employment. This entailed restrictions on employers' freedom of contract to create 
a protected space for trade union activity and to guarantee that wages and some 
other conditions of employment did not fall below a socially acceptable level. These 
changes, however, had minimal impact. Collective bargaining spread slowly and 
little of its progress could be attributed to a more favourable legal climate. For the 
rest, a regime of individual contract prevailed, subject only to a few legislated 
standards. Minimum wage laws respected industrial and regional differences. In 
some provinces, differential male/female wage rates were directly enshrined in law, 
while in others, discrimination was indirectly inscribed by assigning lower wage 
rates to female-dominated occupational categories. These differences, however, 
were small — rarely more than ten per cent — because employers resisted paying 
higher wages to men, despite their breadwinner status. Finally, employment legis-
lation of all kinds was poorly enforced. 
World War II produced the second set of crises that ultimately brought about 
the demise of industrial voluntarism and its replacement by a new regime of 
industrial legality. As in the case of World War I, the federal government invoked 
its emergency powers to rule by order in council. Domestically, its primary 
objectives were to maximize war production and control inflation. To that end, it 
recruited leading industrialists into key government departments, kept organized 
labour frozen out of the inner circles, and adopted World War I precedents as war 
labour policy.40 
The recruitment of women into the labour force was a priority for government, 
but concern about maintaining male breadwinner privilege shaped the pattern of 
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their entry. The overwhelming majority of women were employed in traditional 
female occupations, but even those recruited into war industries were segregated 
into certain occupations and government policy enabled employers to re-classify 
jobs by creating lower-paid categories for less experienced women and youth. This 
segregation helped to keep women out of much of the industrial organization that 
occurred during the war.41 
The federal government's industrial relations policy strengthened its capacity 
to coerce and conciliate. The Defence of Canada Regulations did not specifically 
target trade unionists, but officials used it to detain leading industrial unionists, 
often at key points in strikes. Indeed, by 1941 the government felt compelled to 
curb over-zealous officials by amending the Regulations to stipulate that peaceful 
picketing was not prohibited. Through the Regulations the government banned over 
thirty organizations including the Communists.42 
In addition to coercion, the federal government's early war labour policy also 
promoted peaceful industrial relations through the extension of compulsory con-
ciliation under the IDJA and by the adoption of a statement of principles. The first 
step brought nearly 85 per cent of Canadian industry under the federal 1D1A by 
1941, thereby assuring federal domination of the field. The statement of principles 
in PC 2685 expressed support for the right of workers to organize and bargain 
collectively, and for binding arbitration as a means of resolving disputes over the 
interpretation and application of collective agreements. These principles, however, 
were not enforceable.4 
As the war progressed, the government's labour policy proved unable to 
accomplish its goal of maintaining industrial peace and restraining inflation. In the 
face of growing union militancy, government policy took a coercive turn in 1941. 
The hurdles that a union had to jump through before it could legally strike were 
increased, and a policy of prosecuting unlawful strikers was adopted. In December 
of that year, the government also introduced compulsory wage controls, but these 
actions did not produce labour peace. The increasing use of compulsion against 
workers, coupled with the absence of compulsion aimed at employers, made the 
government's proclaimed support for industrial voluntarism seem hypocritical. Not 
only did the policy fail to contain rank-and-file militancy, it also was becoming a 
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political liability as the CCF was beginning to pose a serious electoral threat in a 
number of provinces.44 
By the beginning of 1943 political support for compulsory collective bargain-
ing was growing. Ontario, British Columbia, and Alberta enacted provincial laws 
in an effort to stave off the CCF threat, but it took another year of militant strike 
action to finally convince King, the architect of industrial voluntarism, that his 
creation was no longer viable. PC 1003 was unveiled on 17 February 1944 and it 
contained an amalgam of three distinct elements: compulsory bargaining, compul-
sory conciliation, and compulsory grievance arbitration. While the first aimed to 
satisfy union demands, the latter two emphasized the government's goal of limiting 
industrial conflict by narrowly circumscribing the timing and purpose of strike 
activity. Moreover, the move to compulsory bargaining was not accompanied by 
any measures that forced employers to conclude collective agreements. Disagree-
ments were ultimately resolved by an economic contest of strength. As a result, a 
kernel of voluntarism resided at the core of industrial pluralism.45 
Refining the Contours of Industrial Pluralism, 1945-48 
PC 1003 brought the government what it wanted most, relative labour peace for the 
duration of the war. The shape of the post-war world, however, still needed to be 
resolved as federal jurisdiction began to wane. Industrial unions pressed to build 
upon their war-time gains by obtaining union security (both financial and member-
ship), industry-wide bargaining, and significant wage increases. Employers op-
posed them at every turn and it was through these struggles that the parameters of 
the post-war settlement were defined. 
The Windsor Ford strike in 1945 set a number of important precedents. First, 
it demonstrated that the state would not deploy massive force to help employers 
maintain production in the face of overwhelming public support for a strike that 
aimed to achieve "legitimate" collective bargaining objectives, even though unlaw-
ful mass-picketing violated employer rights of property and contract. Second, the 
Rand formula, which was used to settle the strike, established the normative 
principle mat trade unions were entitled to financial security (but not necessarily 
membership security) in the form of a dues check-off for all workers in the 
bargaining unit whether or not they were members of the union. In return, however, 
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unions had to behave responsibly by repudiating illegal strikes and disciplining 
members who participated in them.46 
While the Rand formula became the hegemonic form of union security, a 
further wave of strikes was fought to secure higher wages. In this regard, unions 
had to fight against employer recalcitrance and the federal government's declared 
policy of maintaining wage controls past the war's end. The CIO unions initiated a 
common wage plan that sought to overcome regional and industrial differentials. 
A series of strikes established industry-wide agreements in steel, rubber, electron-
ics, and a few other major industries, but broader wage solidarity was not achieved. 
Moreover, these agreements were based on power rather than on right. Both under 
federal collective bargaining law and in the provincial statutes that were passed as 
industrial relations returned to provincial jurisdiction, bargaining rights predomi-
nantly were granted for a specific workplace and employer. The return to provincial 
jurisdiction also gave greater scope for the play of regional economic forces, 
leading to even greater fragmentation. 
In sum, the new regime of industrial pluralism underwrote the gains made by 
industrial unions through the exercise of their economic power in the war and the 
post-war era, allowing for the spread of collective bargaining to core industrial 
sectors. Unions in these sectors obtained for their members improved wages and 
occupationally-based benefits, seniority rights, and protection against arbitrary 
discipline and discharge. The price was that unions were tightly wrapped up in a 
web of industrial legality that constrained militancy, recognized management 
rights, and favoured fragmented bargaining- Moreover, women did not share in the 
benefits of post-war industrial pluralism equally with men. Rather than seeing their 
war-time gains consolidated, women (especially married women) faced govern-
ment policies that pushed them out of the labour market. Those who remained 
employed were segregated into a relatively small number of occupational catego-
ries, often in industries outside the industrial core, and even those who were in 
unions often were bargained into lower-paid female job classifications.47 
III. Industrial Pluralism, 1948-2000 
Introduction 
Industrial citizenship, which comprised the freedom of association, the right to 
representation, and the rule of law, was the crowning achievement of industrial 
pluralism. By substituting legal right for industrial might in order for workers to 
insist that their employers recognize and bargain with their unions and abide by 
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their collective agreements, collective bargaining legislation and grievance arbitra-
tion marked a rupture from the individual] sm of the common law and the absolutism 
of property rights. The post-war employment law regime also saw the imposition 
of liberal democratic constraints on freedom of contract and the rights of private 
property. These constraints took two forms: the enactment of anti-discrimination 
or human rights legislation and the extension of minimum standards of employment 
to a wider range of workers and conditions. Prior to World War II, employers were 
free to discriminate against individuals on the basis of ineluctable characteristics 
such as race and sex, since individual freedom from state compulsion was regarded 
as the paramount liberal value. After the Holocaust, this position was no longer 
tolerable. Moreover, unions endorsed a strategy of incremental legal reform regard-
ing minimum conditions of employment and pushed for restrictions on hours of 
work, vacations with pay, minimum wages, and improvements to the workers' 
compensation regimes. 
Thus, in many respects labour was no longer treated simply as a commodity; 
the employment law regime institutionalized decommodified conceptions of jus-
tice. Collective bargaining legislation enshrined the democratic commitment to 
freedom of association, human rights statutes embodied the liberal commitment to 
fairness and equality, and employment standards acts encapsulated a social under-
standing of public welfare. However, these competing conceptions of justice did 
not completely displace liberal voluntarism's commitment to freedom of contract 
and private property. A residual market voluntarism was the foundation upon which 
industrial pluralism was built. The operative assumption was that bargaining 
disputes should ultimately be settled by reference to the economic power of the 
parties themselves. The privilege to resort to industrial sanctions, the ultimate 
measure of bargaining power, continued to determine the contents of collective 
agreements. Moreover, employers could still call upon a sympathetic judiciary, 
predisposed to the common law's traditional emphasis on respect for individual 
property and contract rights, for assistance in labour disputes. Employment stand-
ards and human rights also operated within a fundamentally liberal voluntarist 
context. Minimum entitlement could not depart too markedly from market norms, 
and anti-discrimination law did not prevent employers from engaging in practices, 
which while facially neutral adversely affected protected groups. Occupational 
segregation, for example, replaced outright discrimination as the primary device 
for maintaining women's subordinate position within the labour market. 
In short, the post-war employment law regime was pluralistic in that the three 
conceptions of justice were institutionalized within it, but it was still liberal 
voluntarist at its core. Moreover, it was also highly fragmented regionally and 
sectorally, and the norms of employment were gendered and racialized. 
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Stalemate or Beachhead: 1948-1964 
After the reconversion period, regionalism once again became a defining element 
of state employment policies as primary jurisdiction over labour relations was 
transferred back to the provinces. While the federal collective bargaining legisla-
tion, the Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act (IRDI Act), which 
came into effect in September 1948, served as a model, its key features were filtered 
through each province's regional political economy. The most marked variations 
from the federal model were in Québec and Saskatchewan, which retained the 
collective bargaining legislation enacted during the war. For organized labour the 
most disturbing legal development was the willingness of conservative provincial 
governments to enact legal restrictions on the exercise of trade unions' collective 
power without imposing equivalent limitations upon employers.4S 
British Columbia saw the greatest amount of such legislative activity. While 
notas draconianas the anti-communistprovisions of the Taft-Hartley Act, for which 
employers had lobbied, the predominant feature of the postwar amendments to the 
Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act was their anti-union tenor. The labour 
board was empowered to order a vote on any "bona fide" settlement offer from an 
employer during a strike or lockout; collective agreements were made actionable 
at common law; and the board was given the power to cancel the certification of 
any union striking illegally. These amendments wrapped unions in a straightjacket 
of legality; any violation of the multitude of restrictions on collective action not 
only threatened a union's legal status to insist upon recognition, it left it open to 
costly civil actions.49 
The beauty of the BC legislation, from the provincial government's perspective, 
was that it both shifted the initiation of coercion away from itself and onto the 
parties, primarily employers, and shifted the locus of the debate about the legiti-
macy of coercion away from the political arena into the judicial one. It was up to 
the courts to decide whether the union was liable to the employer for any damages 
caused.by the breach of the collective bargaining statute or collective agreement. 
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This technique of restricting collective action stood in marked contrast to the 
Ontario approach embodied in the Rights of Labour Act, which provided a prophy-
lactic for trade unions against attempts by employers to use compulsory collective 
bargaining legislation to impose civil liability on trade unions by making it clear 
that a trade union was not a legal entity for the purposes of civil litigation, and that 
a collective agreement was not legally enforceable in the ordinary courts. Initially, 
only Saskatchewan followed this legislative precedent. In most jurisdictions, the 
questions of a trade union's civil liability and the enforceablity of collective 
agreements in the ordinary courts remained as controversial and tricky as they were 
at the beginning of the century.50 
At the war's end, the courts once again became the pre-eminent forum for 
dealing with picketing. The reconversion to peace ushered in the heyday of the 
labour injunction, which was used as a "sword of collective bargaining," rather than 
a "shield of legal rights." While the BC legislation created a strong impetus for the 
use of civil actions to tame trade unions, the existing common law and Criminal 
Code provisions continued to provide effective legal mechanisms for restricting 
traditional strike related tactics in other jurisdictions. Courts were just as likely in 
Ontario as they were in BC to find that mass picketing was an illegal form of 
watching and besetting. ' 
The transition to peace brought the role of the courts to the fore not only in 
restricting strike-related tactics, but also in determining the scope of powers that 
labour relations boards could exercise. In Saskatchewan, judges began to read down 
the labour-friendly legislation and overturn board decisions, prefiguring what 
would become a see-saw vendetta between the courts versus the legislature and the 
board over which legal entity had the final say over collective bargaining jurispru-
dence.52 
Responsible unions were the only legitimate representatives of workers within 
the pluralist version of industrial democracy; communist-dominated or sympathetic 
unions were considered to be beyond the pale. By 1950, with a little assistance from 
the federal and provincial governments and some labour boards, both the TLC and 
CCL union leadership had either purged or side-lined their more radical counter-
parts. The TLC's expulsion of the Canadian Seamen's Union in 1949, followed by 
the Canadian Labour Relations Board's 1950 decision to revoke its certification on 
the ground that as a communist-controlled organization it did not fall within the 
meaning of a union as defined under the IRDI Act, was simply the most blatant 
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example of how labour boards and responsible unions colluded to exclude left-wing 
unions from the benefits of industrial legality.53 
Despite the fairly rapid increase in trade union membership with the advent of 
industrial pluralism, the growth of unionization after World War II was extremely 
uneven. Workers in the resource, mass-production, and transportation industries 
joined their skilled craft brothers in the ranks of organized labour, so that in the 
mid-1950s "the typical union member was a relatively settled, semi-skilled male 
worker within a large industrial corporation." Except in Saskatchewan, coilective 
bargaining legislation did not cover public sector employees, thereby excluding 
increasing numbers of workers from the right to bargain collectively through the 
union of their choice. Morever, even within the private sector, in which some form 
of collective bargaining legislation was very likely to apply, certain industries and 
workplaces were a better fit than others. Only the strongest trade unions obtained 
anything that approximated industry-wide bargaining and, even then in most cases, 
it was not legally enforceable. Bargaining unit determination policies adopted and 
administered by labour relations boards reflected and reinforced fragmentation. 
Plant-by-plant bargaining became the norm. In the secondary sector, which was 
highly competitive and labour intensive, the legislation tended to function more as 
an impediment, than an aid, to union representation and collective bargaining. 
- The structural limitations of industrial pluralism were reinforced and overlaid 
by other features of the post-war compromise. At the macro level, the systemic 
segmentation of the labour market enabled leading firms to concede higher wages 
to some organized workers in the core sectors while at the same time a large 
category of unorganized workers would remain available, helping to lower aggre-
gate labour costs. Workers in core firms shared a narrow economic self-interest in 
maintaining a segmented labour market, since it provided low-cost consumer 
goods. Moreover, the composition of the secondary workforce was sufficiently 
distinct from that of the primary sector such that different working conditions, 
wages, standards, and the absence of union representation were considered natural, 
or, at least, uncontroversial. As Ursel observed, "women constituted the largestpool 
of such labour in Canada and were, therefore, a key component in the segmentation 
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strategy of capital." So, too, were immigrant workers. During the 1950s immigra-
tion played a central roie in the growth of the labour force and as the decade wore 
on countries outside the British Isles provided an increasingly significant source of 
labour. A wage and occupational hierarchy, which divided British immigrants from 
their less affluent eastern and southern European counterparts, was firmly estab-
lished.55 
This racialized occupational and wage hierarchy persisted in the face of 
legislation that was designed to prohibit discrimination on the basis of invidious 
distinctions such as race, religion, and ethnicity. Human rights legislation became 
an important feature of the post-war public policy agenda, although the first piece 
of anti-discrimination legislation in Canada, Ontario's Racial Discrimination Act, 
was enacted in 1944. Inspired by the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights 
in 1948 and drawing upon US models, a series of "fair employment practices" laws 
were enacted, prohibiting employment discrimination on the grounds of race and 
religion. In the early 1960s, discrete fair practices statutes were consolidated into 
omnibus human rights codes under the authority of permanent human rights 
commissions, whose function was to administer a discrimination complaints proc-
ess, to develop public education programs and to advise the government on future 
development of the code. Pioneered in Ontario, by 1965, laws dealing with 
discrimination in employment on the basis of race, creed, and colour were in force 
in eight Canadian jurisdictions. 
By contrast, most forms of employment discrimination on the basis of sex were 
permitted by law until the mid-1960s. The only illegal form of sex discrimination 
in employment was with respect to pay. In 1951; Ontario became the first jurisdic-
tion in the Commonwealth to impose a legal obligation on employers to pay women 
workers the same wages as men who performed the same work when it enacted the 
Female Employees Fair Remuneration Act. This legislation was "rooted in the 
deployment of women's labour during the World War ll and in the postwar human 
rights discourse" and its champions were organized labour, which wanted to ensure 
that women's low wages would not be used to undercut men's, and women's 
groups. However, the positive thrust of this legislation was undermined by its 
narrow commitment to requiring employers to pay women the same as men who 
performed the same work. Small differences in job descriptions were allowed to 
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stand unchallenged as a basis for different wages and a union's consent to occupa-
tional segregation was considered to be a legitimate basis for wage discrimination. 
Employers learned that it was perfectly legal to avoid paying women the same as 
men through the practice of occupation segregation. 
Formal legal equality for women who sought employment was uneven and 
contradictory, revealing a "legislative bias towards access rather man equity." On 
the one hand, there was the extension of basic employment standards, such as 
minimum wages which were initially designed exclusively for women, to men, 
legislation providing for women's equal pay was enacted and the legislative barriers 
to the employment of women, especially married women, were dismantled. On the 
other hand, different wage rates for men and women workers under minimum wage 
legislation were the norm across the country until the late 1960s, unemployment 
insurance disqualified married women workers, and occupational segregation was 
legally acceptable. 
Even under propitious economic conditions industrial pluralism had a limited 
scope. By the mid-1950s, more than 65 per cent of Canadian workers were not 
union members. In fact, between 1955 and 1965 the percentage of the labour force 
unionized in Canada dropped from 33.7 per cent to 29.7. Union leaders focused 
their energies on defending their members' interests, not pursuing a broader agenda 
of social unionism. The type of reforms that organized labour most often demanded, 
minimum employment standards, and amendments to workers' compensation, 
were consistent with a segmentation strategy. In the late 1950s, provincial govern-
ments began to implement a series of changes to minimum standards, with the result 
that by the mid-1960s there were comprehensive minimum standards across the 
country. But these standards were significantly lower than those obtained by 
unionized workers since, by and large, they were devised for the unorganized 
sector. Employment standards legislation was treated as collective bargaining law's 
little sister. Thus, labour law, government policies and employer staffing practices, 
aided in part by union bargaining strategies, converged to help create and sustain 
a low wage sector, one which, in the long run, would have a drag-down effect on 
the conditions of all workers. The beauty of the segmentation strategy was that "the 
state could accommodate the demands of capital for a plentiful supply of cheap 
labour (women and immigrants) and contain the spread of unionization (through a 
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cautious implementation of labour relations acts), without unduly provoking or-
ganized labour." 
Although the 1950s and early 1960s were principally a period of consolidation 
for industrial pluralism, there were clear signs that a crisis was brewing. Initially, 
it was expressed on a regional basis. Militancy in Québec, Newfoundland, and 
British Columbia was crushed by governments and employers who deployed legal 
techniques ranging from repressive legislation to court actions. 
The Golden Age of Industrial Citizenship: J 965-1980 
By the mid-1960s, what had been regional outbreaks of labour unrest consolidated 
across the country to form a massive strike wave. In 1966, working days lost to 
strikes reached an unprecedented number, one-third of which was due to illegal or 
wild-cat strikes. It appeared that union leaders were either unwilling or unable to 
keep the contumacious rank and file within the bounds of industrial legality. 
Several factors drove workers' militancy. Heavy-handed legislation and judi-
cial decisions that disproportionately restricted workers' collective action, com-
bined with wage increases that lagged behind productivity gains, threatened the 
legitimacy of the industrial pluralist regime. Automation, especially on the railways 
and in the post office, not only challenged long-established work rules, but job 
security. Public sector workers were tired of being treated as civil servants whose 
freedom of association and right to engage in collective action was subordinated to 
antiquated notions of political sovereignty. Workers refused to obey the rule of law 
and struck to achieve their demands. 
The strike wave triggered a typically Canadian response. The federal govern-
ment appointed a Task Force, composed of industrial relations experts, to evaluate 
the existing federal labour relations law and policy. In British Columbia and 
Ontario, where employers' successful recourse to the courts had begun to tilt the 
balance away from industrial pluralism and back to individualism and voluntarism, 
the provincial governments appointed commissions to study the problems caused 
by labour injunctions. The expert commissions recommended variations on the 
same solution to the problem of labour unrest — strengthen the institutions of 
industrial pluralism. The idea was to minimize the vestiges of liberal voluntarism. 
In British Columbia, jurisdiction to regulate picketing in a labour dispute was 
transferred from the ordinary courts to labour tribunals, while in Ontario, restric-
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rions on the granting of injunctions in a labour dispute were tightened. The judiciary 
was also told to defer to the expertise of specialized tribunals. 
The militancy of the 1960s not only resulted in the strengthening of industrial 
pluralist institutions, it also led to their extension, albeit in a modified form, to the 
public sector. Starting in Québec and fol lowed by postal workers across the country, 
public sector workers, who outside of Saskatchewan did not enjoy any legal right 
to bargain collectively or to be represented by a union, struck to press for their 
demands. Governments responded by introducing public sector collective bargain-
ing legislation which, although modelled on private sector collective bargaining 
statutes, was inferior in several respects, including: restrictions on strikes and 
lockouts; criteria for arbitration; extensive cooling off measures; restrictions on 
who could strike; constraints on subjects of bargaining; rules regarding the choice 
of bargaining agent; and controls on partisan political activity. By 1973, every 
government in Canada had legislation providing for collective bargaining by public 
sector workers. The result, however, was a patchwork of measures ranging from 
the least restrictive model in Saskatchewan and Québec, which extended private 
sector collective bargaining legislation to the public sector with minimal modifica-
tions, to Ontario, which banned collective action outright for government workers. 
Moreover, with the advent of public sector collective bargaining there was an 
increase in ad hoc back-to-work legislation. Thus, the regime of industrial pluralism 
was modified to deal with the distinguishing feature of collective bargaining in the 
public sector — the absence of market competition as a discipline. Public sector 
collective bargaining legislation marked the third wave of unionization in Canada 
and the increased feminization of the labour movement. Between 1966 and 1976, 
there was a 106 per cent increase in unionization for women compared to a 40 per 
cent increase for men. 3 
Not only were the institutions of industrial pluralism strengthened and ex-
tended, so, too, were the other aspects of the employment law regime. The coverage 
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of human rights codes was expanded beyond groups identified in terms of ineluc-
table characteristics to include marital status, disability and age, and specialized 
adjudicative tribunals began to develop a distinctive human rights jurisprudence. 
Moreover, Canada's international labour commitments and women's increased 
labour market participation, especially in the expanding public sector, combined 
with the increasingly vociferous political demands of the second wave of the 
women's movement to pressure federal and provincial governments to eradicate 
die last vestiges of protective and sex-discriminatory laws, and to enact legislation 
designed to remedy the legacy of sex discrimination in employment. Simultane-
ously, new improved minimum employment standards proliferated and there was 
a wave of occupational health and safety legislative reform. Writing in 1967, H.W. 
Arthurs predicted a golden period of industrial citizenship: 
Today the Canadian worker lives increasingly in a world of rights and duties created not by 
his individual contractual act, but by a process of public and private legislation. Members 
of the industrial community enjoy these rights and duties solely by vi rtuc of their membership 
in the community. In effect there is emerging a new status — that of "industrial citizen" — 
whose juridical attributes may be analogized to those of citizenship generally. 
The next year, the Woods Task Force urged that the distinctive elements of 
industrial pluralism be strengthened at the expense of the common law notions of 
freedom of contract and private property. According to it, strikes and lockouts 
served both as a catalyst and catharsis to parties who had to learn to deal with 
inevitable distributional disputes while coming to an understanding of their sym-
biotic relationship. Regulated disruptions served a valuable purpose in legitimating 
the "superior-subordinate nexus inherent in the employment relationship." Hence, 
responsible trade unionism had to be encouraged, and wages and conditions of work 
could be left to be determined by what were, basically, voluntarily reached 
agreements- Organizational activities should be given support by granting the 
distinctive institutions of industrial pluralism, the labour relations boards, more 
remedial powers and individual contract principles should be negated as much as 
possible. 
Governments across Canada opted for this approach to reducing labour conflict 
and, unlike the 1950s, by and large, the amendments to collective bargaining 
legislation in the 1970s imposed constraints upon employers. A range of labour-
friendly changes were made: preambles declaring that public policy supported 
collective bargaining were added; the remedial powers of boards, especially with 
respect to unfair labour practices and breaches of the duty to bargain in good faith, 
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were strengthened; provisions for the imposition of first collective agreements in 
specified circumstances were introduced; unions gained the right to compulsory 
dues check off; minimum reinstatement rights for workers who participated in 
economic strikes were enacted; and permanent replacement workers and profes-
sional strike breakers were prohibited. In 1977, organized labour achieved the acme 
of its demands when the Parti-Québécois government introduced legislation that 
severely limited the right of employers to use temporary replacement workers in a 
lawful strike or lockout. This step went farther than most industrial pluralist experts 
were prepared to tolerate. 
Just as the institutions of industrial pluralism flourished during the 1970s, so, 
too, did direct government intervention. The 1970s were a period of consolidation 
of women's participation in the labour market and the women's movement, which 
had pressured the federal government to establish the Royal Commission on the 
Status of Women in 1967, actively lobbied for legislation designed to promote sex 
equality in the workplace and allow women to combine child-bearing with employ-
ment. The Commission's 1970 report highlighted the pervasive nature of sex 
discrimination in the workplace and government legislation. By 1973 employment 
protection for pregnant employees was provided, in one form or another, in the 
federal jurisdiction as well as in six provinces, and in 1972 the Unemployment 
Insurance Act was revised to provide for maternity benefits. As well, human rights 
tribunals across the country made it illegal for employers to harass sexually female 
employees. In 3 972, the federal government quietly ratified JLO Convention 100 
on equal pay for work of equal value. By the end of the 1970s, the federal 
government, Québec, and the Yukon introduced legislation putting the principle of 
equal value into practice. Despite both the huge influx of women into the labour 
market and the legislative commitment to formal equality for women workers in 
employment in every jurisdiction in Canada, at the end of the 1970s the nature of 
women's paid work remained quite static. Legal prohibitions against discrimination 
on the basis of sex, while an important political victory, did not address the range 
of policies and practices that, while not explicitly discriminatory on the basis of 
sex, had a discriminatory impact on women workers. Women continued to be 
crowded into a small range of low-paid occupations. Moreover, the female norm 
of employment departed significantly from that of men; they were much more likely 
to work part time and on a temporary basis.67 
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By 1970, minimum wages of general application, hours-of-work regulation, 
public holidays, paid vacations, and notice of termination of employment became 
the norm in many jurisdictions across Canada. Moreover, during the late 1970s, the 
model of occupational health and safety regulation that had prevailed since the turn 
of the century had run out of steam. Worker unrest and renewed concern about the 
social cost of work-induced disability led to a wave of regulatory reform. These 
reforms focused on two aspects of the regulatory system, in ways that made it more 
pluralistic. First, the internal responsibility system of the firm was reformed by 
giving workers some legal rights that were exercisable against their employers. The 
strength of these rights varied from jurisdiction, but they almost always included 
some kind of right to know about hazardous conditions, a right to participate in 
discussions about the identification and control of hazards, and a right to refuse 
unsafe work. The second target was to rationalize and strengthen the external 
responsibility system by: enacting omnibus health and safety statutes to replace a 
multiplicity of sector or hazard specific statutes; putting more emphasis on the 
control of health hazards; and centralizing administration and enforcement in 
ministries of labour. However, tensions were immanent within the emerging model. 
On the one hand, the ideology of common interest provided the foundation for 
mandated partial self-regulation while, on the other, it was recognized that de facto 
self-regulation (the result of chronic under-enforcement) had failed in the past. 
Some countervailing mechanisms were needed to spur employer health and safety 
activity. In practice, the new OHS regime relied primarily on the reformed internal 
responsibility system, but in the absence of consensus many workers found them-
selves powerless to force their employers to act. However, when workers demanded 
state enforcement, they were often put off by officials on the ground that they should 
be resolving OHS disputes directly with their employer. In this way, the new regime 
tried to preserve a core of voluntarism that was consistent with industrial plural-
es 
ism. 
Despite the fact that by the end of the 1970s contract was no longer the 
dominant principle in collective labour relations, the scope of freedom of associa-
tion for workers was severely constrained under industrial pluralism. Unions of the 
responsible kind were predominantly wholesalers of labour power, not vehicles for 
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the expression of class power. The separation between the economic and political 
was firmly policed when it came to workers' collective action. The 1972 common 
front strikes were met with old-style coercion and union leaders who defied court 
orders were convicted of contempt, receiving jail sentences of up to a year in 
duration. While the 1976 CLC-led Day of Protest against the federal Liberal 
government's Anti-Inflation legislation, which suspended collective bargaining 
and imposed wage controls for three years, was a much more orderly affair, it, too, 
received legal sanction. The Supreme Court subsequently affirmed the federal 
government's right to suspend free collective bargaining across the country on the 
ground that double-digit inflation constituted a national emergency. Moreover, 
when Jean-Claude Parrot, the leader of the postal clerks, had the temerity to refuse 
to obey the government's draconian back-to-work legislation, he was charged 
under the Criminal Code, prosecuted, and convicted. Union leaders who did not 
control members who defied legal restrictions on their freedom to strike faced 
incarceration. Collective withdrawal of labour power outside of a tightly restricted 
economic frame simply was not tolerable. However, the tradeoff was real gains for 
workers in terms of wages and economic security.69 
This bargain was of limited value for workers employed in the secondary 
labour market, many of whom were women and members of visible minorities. 
Industrial pluralism did not provide collective bargaining to one-half of the Cana-
dian workforce. Not only was it perfectly acceptable for employers to oppose 
unionization, the technical requirements for certification made it simply too risky 
and too costly for all but the most determined union to attempt to organize the 
private service sector or small workplaces. The unsuccessful attempt to organize 
bank workers combined with a series of first contract strikes in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s (many of which involved women workers), to demonstrate that 
collective bargaining legislation still operated as a barrier to unionization in certain 
contexts. Despite this, organized labour's confidence in industrial pluralism was 
not shaken and it maintained its commitment to incremental law reform. 
The legislative refinement of industrial pluralism in the private sector never 
overcame labour market segmentation. Similarly, the legal emphasis on equal 
rights, especially those for women, did not penetrate the deeper structural fragmen-
tation embedded in the employment law regime. Moreover, the Anti-Inflation Act 
of 1975, which imposed wage and price controls across the country, presaged the 
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era of coercive controls, or permanent exceptionalism, that undermined industrial 
pluralism in the public sector almost as soon as it was institutionalized. 
Deepening Contradictions: 1980s 
During the 1970s, the industrial pluralist regime of legality was subjected to 
contradictory pressures. Initially, the state responded to workers' militancy by 
strengthening its distinctive features, but, by mid-decade, the federal government's 
decision to suspend collective bargaining across the country signalled a broader 
realignment in the post-war entente. The contradiction between equality and 
monetarist economic policies that was latent in the late 1970s deepened, and by the 
mid-1980s the postwar employment regime was stretched to its breaking point. 
Although the federal Liberal government started off the decade with what 
amounted to a new national policy, a centrepiece of which was a commitment to 
individual and equality rights embodied within the Charter of Rights and Free-
doms, in the face of the severe recession of 1981-82 it soon targeted its own workers 
as a scapegoat for the country's economic woes. In 1982, it imposed wage controls 
on them and suspended collective bargaining rights for two years. This legislation, 
although not as comprehensive as the earlier controls, was significantly harsher. 
Moreover, the Treasury Board insisted that it had the right unilaterally to designate 
a government employee as essential and, thus, prohibit them from participating in 
an otherwise lawful strike. 
Most provincial governments quickly followed the federal government's lead, 
auguring an era of permanent exceptionalism for industrial pluralism in the public 
sector. By 1983, six provincial governments had imposed variations of the federal 
government's 6 and 5 legislation on their own workers. There was also a massive 
increase in the use of back-to-work legislation to end what were otherwise lawful 
public sector strikes. The decision to target public sector workers for coercive 
controls transcended the political orientation of the government. Not only did the 
Social Credit government in DC attack public sector unions, so too did the Parti-
Québécois government, which historically had close ties with public sector un-
72 
ions. 
The wage control and back-to-work legislation of the early 1980s presaged a 
wholesale assault on public sector workers' collective bargaining rights as the 
decade progressed. The 1984 election of the Conservative Party as the federal 
government marked an ideological turning point in Canada as it initiated a round 
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of deregulation and privatization and attacked public spending and the deficit. The 
legitimacy of the Conservative government's economic policies was enhanced by 
the 1985 Report of the Royal Commission on Economic Union, which had been 
appointed by the Liberals to assess Canada's economic prospects and suggest how 
the government should retool the economy to meet, the global challenges of the 
future. The Report strongly advocated the deregulation of the labour market and 
the dismantling of barriers to trade. According to it, "the presumption must be that 
in the great majority of cases, the market is the best available mechanism for 
resource allocation. The burden must be on those who propose intervention."73 
In this political climate, public sector workers' collective bargaining rights had 
little legitimacy. Not only did the Tories* extend the wage controls on their own 
workers, they took a no-hold's-barred approach to bargaining, going so far as to 
authorize, for the very first time by the federal government, the use of replacement 
workers by a crown corporation. In the spring of 1987, the evening news displayed 
pitched battles between letter carriers, replacement workers, and police as Canada 
Post sought to keep the mail moving by using strikebreakers. That fall, the 
government put .an end to the postal clerks* rotating strikes by back-to-work 
legislation which provided that any union official who defied it would be deposed 
from elected office, 
The continuing assault on public sector workers' collective bargaining rights 
was not confined to the federal government. Absolute prohibitions on the right to 
strike, increases in the proportion of workers designated as essential, limitations in 
the scope of bargaining, the imposition of ability to pay as a criterion to be 
considered by arbitrators when fashioning a settlement, and the increase in the 
power of the executive to end strikes and impose settlements were features common 
to many of the new provincial public sector collective bargaining regimes. Simul-
taneously, services were reduced and contracted out, and managers took a harder 
line at the bargaining table.75 
Initially, it appeared as if governments would be able to suspend or repeal 
industrial pluralism in the public sector with impunity. In response to the suspension 
of collective bargaining and the imposition of wage controls, the Public Service 
Alliance of Canada lodged a complaint with the ILO, and filed a writ in a Canadian 
court alleging that its freedom of association had been violated. Unions that used 
their collective power to protest the infringements on their members' freedoms 
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were met with legal coercion as governments across Canada invoked the rule of 
law as a justification for restricting collective action. In the mid-1980s, the New-
foundland Association of Public Employees (NAPE) was subjected to huge fines for 
engaging in illegal strikes and dozens of picketers were arrested for violating a court 
injunction. Ultimately, Fraser March, the president of NAPE, was sentenced to four 
months in jail and placed on two years probation for contempt of court. In Alberta, 
the illegally striking nurses' union ignored the orders of the province's labour board 
that they return to work, only to be confronted with huge fines and court actions 
for criminal contempt.76 
While the FLO had little difficulty in finding that governments across Canada 
repeatedly had violated international covenants designed to protect workers' rights 
to associate freely and bargain collectively, Canadian courts were not similarly 
inclined. In the infamous right-to-strike trilogy, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled 
that the freedom of association guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms did not protect modern legislative rights such as collective bargaining. 
In fact, each time that unions argued before the Supreme Court of Canada that legal 
restrictions on the scope of collective bargaining, the right of workers to select a 
bargaining agent of their choice, and the right to strike or to engage in peaceful 
picketing constituted an unjustifiable infringement on fundamental rights and 
freedoms they were unsuccessful. The highest court made it clear that the Charter 
protected individual, not collective rights, and that it was not prepared to disturb 
basic common law principles of contract and private property. Not only did 
restrictions on public sector collective bargaining rights pass legal muster, so, too, 
did blanket injunctions and criminal contempt proceedings. However, in 1987 the 
Vander Zalm government in BC managed to overstep the bounds of acceptable legal 
coercion when it sought an injunction to stop the one-day general strike planned 
by the provincial federation of labour on the grounds the threatened action 
amounted to the use of force as a means of accomplishing governmental change, 
and thereby constituted criminal sedition. The BC Supreme Court endorsed the 
unions' request that the action be dismissed.77 
By contrast with the legislative assault on public sector workers, in the private 
sector the industrial pluralist regime survived, albeit with increased regional 
differences. Restrictions on private sector collective bargaining rights depended not 
only upon the political ideology of the provincial government, but also upon the 
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nature of the regional economy. In the early 1980s, highly resource dependent 
economies were severely squeezed, and it was during this period that British 
Columbia, Alberta, and Saskatchewan introduced changes to their private sector 
labour relations legislation that made it harder for unions to organize, intervened 
in their internal affairs, and restricted their ability to resort to collective action. In 
many respects, these changes were reminiscent of the restrictive provisions enacted 
by the British Columbia and Alberta governments in the late 1940s and early 
1950s.78 
It was only in Manitoba and Ontario that industrial pluralism in the private 
sector was strengthened. In Manitoba, the NDP governed for most of the decade and 
it began its ru le in the early 1980s, before the recession was entrenched, by enacting 
a series of amendments that labour had been calling for since the 1970s. In Ontario, 
manufacturing recovered in the mid-1980s, at the same time the Liberals, with the 
help of the NDP, deposed the long-ruling Tories. The result was some legislative 
tinkering to the collective bargaining legislation designed to assist unions.79 
These minor legislative improvements, however, did little to protect workers 
from the ravages of work restructuring or make it easier for unions to organize the 
growing secondary labour market. The Gainers strike in Calgary in 1986 epito-
mized the extent to which a determined employer could call upon the courts for 
assistance in deploying replacement workers to. defeat a strike in the absence of 
legislative restrictions on the use of temporary replacement workers. Faced with 
low wage competitors like Gainers, the big three meat packers refused the United 
Food and Commercial Workers' demand that they maintain industry-wide bargain-
ing, and labour boards across the country ruled that it was unlawful for the union 
to resort to collective action to insist on anything other than bargaining at the level 
of the workplace. With the demise of broader-based bargaining in meat packing, 
wages dropped, unionization declined, and workplace injuries increased. More-
over, provisions such as first contract arbitration did little to shift the balance of 
power in favour of workers in the private service sector. Contracting out increased 
and collective bargaining legislation imposed few barriers on employers who were 
intent on restructuring in ways that had the effect of avoiding unionization, 
78 
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The recession initiated a fundamental restructuring of die Canadian economy. 
In 1982, union density peaked at 40 per cent, but it soon began to decline as 
manufacturing jobs were lost never to return. Unemployment was high and the 
private service sector outstripped the goods producing sector in creating jobs. The 
number of annual union certifications dropped from a per year average of 3500 in 
1970s to 3000 in 1980s. Workers and their unions were unable to retain real wage 
levels, strike activity declined, master agreements were torn up, and two tiered 
contracts were implemented.81 
At the same time as the collective power of workers was being undermined, 
substantive equality or equity was being institutionalized in law. The early 1980s 
marked the apogee of second-wave feminism's campaign for women's equality 
rights; the most prominent being the guarantee of sex equality in the Canadian 
constitution in 1982. The Liberal government appointed a Royal Commission to 
examine ways to achieve greater equality for groups historically discriminated 
against in the labour market. Across the country human rights codes were amended 
to prohibit indirect discrimination and impose on employers a duty to accommodate 
individuals who were discriminated against by workplace rules, practices, and 
policies. Sexual harassment was prohibited and, in several jurisdictions, so too was 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. As the decade progressed, the 
highest court adopted a broader, substantive, less formal, approach, to sex discrimi-
nation overturning outright or limiting a number of decisions from the 1970s that 
had restricted women's rights.82 
In 1985, the equality rights in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms came into 
effect and Judge Abel la issued her report on equality in employment, which coined 
the term "employment equity." In response, the Conservative government enacted 
the Employment Equity Act, which covered federally regulated undertakings, and 
the Federal Contractors Compliance program. This legislation monitored the 
attempts of federal enterprises to achieve proportional representation for target 
groups through a public reporting mechanism; it did not impose numerical targets 
or quotas. By the end of the decade, five provinces had enacted pay equity 
legislation which imposed a legal duty on employers to ensure that men's and 
women's jobs of the same value received the same pay, although only the Ontario 
legislation covered the private sector. 
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But the problem was that neither pay nor employment equity legislation did 
anything to stop the underlying deterioration in terms and conditions of employ-
ment generally. The emphasis on substantive equality at a time when the labour 
market was polarizing and employment conditions for the majority of workers were 
deteriorating fuelled a backlash against equality which gained momentum in the 
1990s.84 
On the employment standards front, there was a flurry of legislative activity 
to improve maternity leave entitlements and provide parental leave. Québec went 
the farthest in requiring employers to accommodate the family and employment 
responsibilities of their workers. Ontario led the pack when it came to notice and 
severance pay. it also made extensive revisions to its Occupational Health and 
Safety Act in response to a number of plant occupations designed to force the state 
to ensure that employers met their legal obligations to provide a safe workplace. 
The main thrust of the amendments was to extend the bipartite structures for 
monitoring and regulating workplace health and safety down to the shop floor. This 
had the effect of absolving the government of responsibility in the setting and 
enforcing of health and safety standards and shifting it to the labour market parties. 
In the economic context of the 1980s, the effect of the legislation was to make 
occupational health and safety regulation even more market driven. 
i The massive lay-offs of non-unionized, middle-level employees in the early 
1980s resulted in an explosion of wrongful dismissal litigation. Employees argued 
that dismissal for economic reasons did not constitute just cause at law and that 
employers were required to pay them damages that amounted to reasonable notice. 
Courts accepted this argument; however, since reasonable notice was linked to the 
length of employment service, the employee's age and occupational status, wrong-
ful dismissal litigation, and severance packages tended only to benefit a narrow 
band of employees relatively high up in the occupational hierarchy. The increasing 
numbers of contingent workers employed in part-time, temporary, and low status 
jobs derived little benefit from the common law. 
By the time the Conservative government won its second consecutive federal 
election in 1988, privatization had eclipsed equality as the dominant discourse in 
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Canadian politics. The Free Trade deal with the United States was the most 
profound step in the direction of economic continentalism and symbolized the 
hegemony of neo-liberalism. The emphasis on market-driven restructuring and the 
renewed legitimacy of individual ordering through contract and private property 
undermined the conditions upon which the industrial pluralist regime in the private 
sector had flourished without requiring a frontal assault on its central tenets. During 
the 1980s it was possible for governments simultaneously to exalt the superiority 
of market voluntarism, on the one hand, and substantive equality, on the other, when 
it came to the legal regulation of the labour market. The decade not only demon-
strated the significance of broader macro-economic forces and political shifts on 
the law, it also demonstrated the flexibility in the regime of liberal legality. At the 
same time as courts and legislatures institutionalized the concept of substantive 
equality within the law, governments did not face any legal constraints in introduc-
ing labour market policies that heightened fragmentation and increased inequality. 
The Hegemony of the Market: The! 990s 
During the 1990s, the federal government abandoned the last shreds of any 
commitment to full employment in its determination to fight the deficit and, 
together with provincial governments, substituted workfare for welfare as the 
guiding theme of social policy and embraced flexibility as the defining charac-
teristic of a well functioning labour market. New technology and increased inter-
national trade were the drivers behind the economic revolution known as 
globalization, and nation states argued that it was necessary to submit any vestiges 
of political control over their national economies to the logic of the international 
market. In Canada, this economic wisdom was firmly institutionalized and it 
transcended traditional party politics; the 1988 Free Trade Agreement with the 
United States, negotiated by the Tory government, was extended to include Mexico 
by the Liberals in 1993. The need to adjust to international competition was used 
to justify the deteriorating standard of employment and the degradation of the social 
wage. Polarization and inequality in the Canadian labour market increased. Eco-
nomic restructuring undermined the conditions for industrial pluralism to function 
in the private sector and simultaneously fuelled resentment against public sector 
workers and legal measures designed to achieve equality in employment. As 
legislatures across Canada asserted the primacy of market voluntarism and individ-
ual liberty, the courts increasingly became the defenders of equality; however, they 
were less willing to protect workers' rights to engage in collective action. Moreover, 
the very nature of the employment relationship was being transformed as capital 
has sought to shift the risks of production even further on to workers by avoiding 
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all forms of political and legal regulation other than the individual liberty of the 
commercial contract.87 
During the 1991-92 recession, the attack on the public sector deepened and the 
commitment to industrial pluralism was permanently undermined in favour of 
unilateral paternalism. No longer was the assault on the collective bargaining rights 
of public sector workers characterized as a temporary inflation fighting measure, 
but, rather, governments across Canada announced that they wanted to lead the way 
in wage restraint. Public sector unions were confronted with a choice between two 
evils: either accept wage freezes and reductions or endure massive lay-offs. In 
general, governments invoked three general types of measures: the first, legislated 
wage controls; the second, hard bargaining; and the third, unique to BC, the 
implementation of co-operative processes, reinforced by inducements, to engage 
public sector unions in cost reduction exercises. The first two measures provoked 
a wave of militancy as public sector workers across the country struck, following 
the precedent set in the 1980s by Québec and Newfoundland public sector workers 
and nurses.88 
Once again, the federal government led the attack against public sector 
workers. In 1991, it announced that wage increases for its employees would be 
capped at 3 per cent and threatened to legislate the right to contract out public 
service work. In response, PSAC embarked on the largest strike by a single union in 
Canada's history as over 100,000 workers walked off the job. Although the 
government was found to have bargained in bad faith, it nonetheless legislated its 
employees back-to-work on terms virtually identical to what it had initially offered. 
Once elected, the Liberals simply extended the former Conservative government's 
wage controls until 1997. In its complaint to the ILO that the federal government 
was violating its members' right to bargain collectively, PSAC documented how the 
1994 controls were but the latest installment in the campaign, first begun in 1981 
by the Liberals, to retrench upon public sector workers' rights. The Freedom of 
Association Committee of the ILO expressed "its serious concern at the frequent 
recourse had by the [Canadian] Government to statutory limitations on collective 
bargaining."89 
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While the federal government's attack on its workers may have been the most 
blatant, that by the NDP government in Ontario was the most duplicitous. It 
illustrated the extent to which economics trumped ideology; shortly after the social 
democratic party was elected, Ontario experienced the deepest recession since the 
Depressions. In 1993, the Rae government announced its Expenditure Control Plan, 
which would entail the loss of 11,000 jobs as part the $4 billion cut in expenditures, 
and its Social Contract, by which it hoped to induce public sector unions to 
participate in neo-corporatist arrangements in order to lend an aura of legitimacy 
to the imposition of a three year wage freeze on over 900,000 workers in the broader 
public sector. Although the government called its initiative a social contract, it used 
the threat of an additional 20,000 to 40,000 job cuts as a stick to prod labour. When 
the union-led Public Services Coalition rejected the government's terms and 
unveiled an alternative plan, the government went ahead and legislated The Social 
Contract Act, making a mockery out of the notion of a voluntary agreement. It 
imposed a three year wage freeze and empowered employers both to open unilat-
erally collective agreements in order to achieve the mandated cuts, allowing them 
to impose up to 12 days of unpaid leave, and to ignore provisions in the Employment 
Standards Act. As a gesture to equity, workers earning under $30,000 a year were 
exempted from the roll backs and the government guaranteed that the controls 
would not affect pay equity. As a sop to voluntarism, it gave unions and employers 
just over a month to reach agreements on compensation reductions, with the 
inducement that "voluntary" agreements would only have to meet 80 per cent of 
the imposed cut-back,.and laid-off workers would be able to access a Job Security 
Fund. To add insult to injury, the same day that it imposed the Social Contract, the 
NDP government also amended the Crown Employees Collective Bargaining Act, 
which perfected industrial pluralism for government workers by extending the right 
to strike to them. Public sector unions' response was to withdraw their support from 
the NDP, which was soundly trounced by the Tories in the 1995 election, and file a 
formal complaint with the ILO.9 
Public sector workers only enjoyed the institutions of industrial pluralism for 
a decade before they were suspended by the Anti-Inflation Act in 1975. Beginning 
in the 1980s, their collective rights were subject to legislative assault, with the result 
that their wages have declined both in real terms and relative to the private sector. 
Moreover, thousands of jobs were lost due to downsizing, privatization, and 
contracting out. The extraordinarily coercive measures deployed against public 
sector workers were justified on the ground that the market does not have control 
90 
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over the public sector. In the absence of competition, repression is necessary to 
discipline public sector workers. The Ontario Conservative government took this 
logic to an extreme when it revoked union successor rights, thereby ousting unions 
and abrogating collective agreements, when a public enterprise is sold to private 
interests. 
In the 1990s, changes to collective bargaining legislation in the private sector 
were increasingly ideologically driven. Although the basic structure of the post-war 
legal regime remained intact, provincial governments, depending upon their politi-
cal persuasion, tinkered with it either to make it easier for unions to organize and 
obtain collective agreements or imposed additional requirements on union certifi-
cation in the name of protecting individual freedom in the face of "big" labour. In 
the early 1990s, NOP governments, first in Ontario and then in BC, introduced a 
series of amendments to private sector collective bargaining legislation that gave 
unions much of what they had been asking for since the 1970s. The most significant 
changes included easier access to certification and first contract arbitration, expe-
dited unfair labour practice procedures, and restrictions on the use of replacement 
workers. By contrast, Conservative governments in Alberta, Manitoba, and later, 
Ontario, introduced legislative reforms that revoked the traditional Canadian prac-
tice of certifying trade unions on the basis of membership evidence, and imple-
mented the US model of requiring a representation vote in every instance. The 
breakdown of the post-war consensus on the benefits of union representation and 
collective bargaining was most sharply illustrated in Ontario, where the Conserva-
tive government repealed the previous NDP government's amendments without 
holding public hearings, calling its new legislation An Act to Restore Fairness in 
Collective Bargaining? 
Despite some modest attempts to update collective bargaining legislation to 
bring it in line witli the labour market of the 1990s, the regime lost much of its 
purchase. Social democratic initiatives to refine industrial pluralism were too little, 
too late; the changes simply did not meet the challenges posed by the restructured 
labour market. Economic restructuring and corporate reorganization, especially 
vertical disintegration achieved via out-sourcing and contracting out, and the 
proliferation in the use of non-standard employment undermined the effectiveness 
of industrial pluralism in the private sector. 
Union density in the private sector decreased across Canada, in part due to the 
changing composition of economic activity. From 1976 to 1992 union density in 
the goods sector declined from 43 to 38 per cent. This substantial decline is largely 
accounted for by the drop in employment and the consequent decline of unioniza-
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tion in manufacturing: the share of paid workers in manufacturing dropped from 
22 to 16 per cent and their unionization rate dropped from 43 to 33 per cent from 
1976 to 1992. In contrast, the service sector saw major growth both in employment 
and unionization during the same period; however, the growth in unionization was 
largely confined to the public service sector, which was under attack. 
Not only was organized labour unable to unionize the private service sector, 
increasingly it was unable to defend what it had won. The informal bargaining 
structures, master agreements, and pattern-bargaining in particular, that large 
industrial unions developed to mediate and modify the fragmentation that resulted 
from the formal bargaining structure, were rejected by employers on the grounds 
that they faced increased competition and industrial restructuring. Beginning with 
meat-packing, employers in the steel, forest, and pulp and paper industries opted 
out of broader bargaining structures. Since unions do not have the legal right to use 
economic sanctions to compel employers to recognize a modified bargaining 
structure there was little they could do to halt the decentralization and fragmentation 
of bargaining. 
There has also been a downward trend in wage settlements and an upward trend 
in long-term collective agreements. In 1994, Québec amended its collective bar-
gaining legislation to permit collective agreements of six years duration. Moreover, 
in the resource sector once powerful unions have agreed to accept wage reductions 
in the event that world prices for commodities fall. Throughout the 1990s, capital 
has been Very successful in shifting more of the risks of production on to workers 
without sharing the profits. 
The contraction in unionization in the private sector has gone hand in hand 
with an erosion of standard employment — full time, indeterminate employment 
with one employer. The proliferation of non-standard employment arrangements 
has been the most significant recent labour market trend. In 1997, the growth of 
nonstandard employment was so extensive in the 1980s and 1990s that only 33 per 
cent of Canadian workers were said to hold "normal jobs." Moreover, its increase 
coincides with growing polarization in earnings amongst Canadians, which has 
deepened labour market poverty, especially among the young and the old. Young 
male workers — especially those that already had low earnings — bore the brunt 
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of this trend, as evidenced by the widening gap between the highest and the lowest 
96 
earning men. 
The heightened polarization in men's wages has accompanied a convergence 
in men's and women's wages and employment profiles, and an increased wage and 
employment polarization among women workers. While fragmentation is still 
gendered, it is less so than it was prior to the mid-1980s and increasingly it has 
taken a generational form in light of the restructured labour market. The deteriora-
tion in the standard employment relationship, especially for young men, has fuelled 
a backlash against equity initiatives directed at women and members of visible 
minority groups. This was most evident in Ontario, where a centre-piece of the 
Conservative Party's campaign against the NDP government was its attack on the 
Employment Equity Act of 1993. The Tories ' charge that the NDP legislation was a 
form of illegitimate reverse discrimination had a great deal of popular appeal. One 
of its first legislative moves was to enact the Act to RepealJob Quotas and Restore 
Merit.97 
Pay equity legislation, even in Ontario under the Tories, survived the backlash. 
However, it is not clear that governments will fund equal pay. Unless they do, 
employers in the broader public sector will be faced with the choice of laying off 
workers to make good on pay equity obligations. In the Atlantic provinces, pay 
equity has been sacrificed to public sector wage restraint. In 1999, the federal 
government reluctantly decided to ante up S3.8 billion owed to members of PSAC 
when the federal court upheld the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal's ruling. 
However, the PSAC decision became the focus of an equity backlash. It was 
portrayed in the press as unfair to taxpayers and a deviation from market norms. 
The response to employment equity also illustrates this process. Although the 
federal government strengthened its Employment Equity Act in 1995, the statute 
does not impose an obligation on the government to create new positions in order 
to achieve proportional representation in the occupational hierarchy. What it does 
is impose an obligation on employers to report on the composition of their 
workforce and make all reasonable efforts to eradicate systemic barriers to propor-
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tional representation for equity groups. Despite die weakness of the equity provi-
sions, the legislation is increasingly regarded as unfair. The attack against substan-
tive equality initiatives such as those embodied in pay and employment equity 
legislation is fuelled both by a defence and celebration of the free market, on die 
one hand, and declining economic prospects for young men, on the other. These 
two elements are united by a shared commitment to an equal opportunities frame-
work, one that sees the role of the state as limited to prohibiting overt discrimination 
and a return to formal conceptions of legal equality." 
During the 1990s, with a few social democratic exceptions, legislatures across 
Canada lost what little taste they had for measures designed to achieve substantive 
equality in employment. In this context, courts were regarded as the last bastion for 
preserving any public policy commitment to equity. The Supreme Court of Canada 
has issued a number of decisions that have strengdiened employers' obligations to 
provide a discrimination-free workplace and to make accommodations for indi-
viduals who are adversely affected by workplace rules, policies, or practices. 
Moreover, the Court has also imposed corresponding duties on unions not to 
discriminate and to make workplace accommodations. It has also issued a number 
of decisions that have tempered the obvious harshness of the common law of 
employment and reinforced a remedial approach to the interpretation of employ-
ment standards legislation. However, although the Supreme Court of Canada has 
acknowledged the inequality in bargaining power in the labour market, it has 
refused to take any significant initiatives to ameliorate it on the ground that it is the 
appropriate responsibility of elected officials. Occasionally, this hands-off ap-
proach has redounded to the advantage of organized labour; in Lavigne the Court 
upheld the use of the compelled dues check off for political purposes. Moreover, 
in 1999, the Court made a slight detour from its position of deference to legislatures 
in the realm of collective bargaining when it held that legislative restrictions on 
peaceful consumer leafleting for informational purposes by unions amounted to an 
unjustifiable violation of the Charter's guarantee of freedom of expression. How-
ever, in permitting the practice of consumer leafletting in the labour context, the 
Court was careful to distinguish this informational activity from the coercive 
activity of a conventional labour picket.1 
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Like collective bargaining legislation, the fortune of employment standards 
statutes has depended upon the political persuasion of the government in power. 
Generally, however, improving minimum employment standards or revising them 
to meet the changed labour market has been portrayed as pricing Canadian workers 
out of jobs. More troubling is the fact that many standards are simply not enforced 
as governments across Canada have gutted the bureaucracies which had the 
authority to enforce the legislation. 
Workers* compensation has also been reshaped by neo-liberalism. Under the 
guise that workers' compensation boards are running huge unfunded liabilities, 
caused by overly generous benefits, several provinces have changed their workers' 
compensation legislation. Some of the measures directly attack injured workers by 
reducing benefit levels, denying compensation for certain types of injuries, such as 
those caused by workplace stress, and limiting compensation for chronic pain. 
Other measures are more subtle, but equally harmful. For example, in some 
jurisdictions fixed pensions for permanent disability have been replaced by wage-
loss systems that allow boards to reduce or eliminate payments to injured workers 
on the ground that there is theoretically a job in the labour market they are capable 
of performing, even though they are unemployed. Similarly, return to work obli-
gations are often evaded or provide a pretext for hiding lost-time injuries. Finally, 
the increased reliance on experience rating in funding workers' compensation 
systems detrimentally effects injury reporting and more closely aligns occupational 
health and safety with market measures of value.101 
IV. Conclusion 
At the end of the millennium, individualism, competition, and the legal relations 
of contract and property vie with the official discourses of industrial pluralism and 
industrial citizenship for hegemony in the labour market. Ideologically, workers' 
collective action is increasingly portrayed as the self-serving and coercive privilege 
of big labour and, materially, it has less purchase in a world in which capital is less 
fettered by the political strictures of the nation state. While there has been no direct 
and sustained legal assault on private sector workers' freedom to associate and right 
to bargain collectively, the terrain on which these rights operate has narrowed. As 
an ever greater proportion of the labour force falls outside the scope of the 
institutions of industrial pluralism, political support for workers' collective rights 
is undermined, and the balance is likely to shift even farther towards individualism. 
Simultaneously, the legislative assault on public sector workers' collective rights 
illustrates the extent to which industrial pluralism is based upon a fundamental 
commitment to market voluntarism. It also evinces the degree to which fragmen-
tation and competition between workers has been internalized; governments across 
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Canada have faced little opposition in dismantling industrial pluralism in the public 
sector. 
The project of globalization and the accompanying logic of the race to the 
bottom have also made suspect legally enforceable minimum standards that con-
strain the exploitation of labour. Conservative and social democratic governments 
warn Canadian workers that legal standards which provide a living wage, a 
modicum of dignity at work and personal time outside of employment will price 
them out of the global labour market. At the same time, deep cutbacks to the public 
sector have undermined the capacity of the state to enforce employment legislation 
and the benefits of voluntary, co-operative bipartite arrangements are invoked to 
legitimate the devolution of standard setting and enforcement to the market parties. 
In the current economic context, this shift in responsibility favours capital at the 
expense of workers. 
Unbridled capitalism has no respect for human rights.102 While it is extremely 
difficult in a liberal democracy to revoke guarantees of formal legal equality after 
they have been won, such measures do not address the deeper, structural relations 
and institutions that generate and sustain substantive inequality. The partial legal 
institutionalization of substantive equality in Canadian law, itself the product of 
struggle, is under attack as people face tougher economic times. The "excessive" 
demands of feminists and "unfair" competition from poorly skilled immigrant 
labour are being blamed for the declining economic prospects of young white men. 
The unequal division of household labour," especially with respect to the care of 
children, will likely only deepen women's historical disadvantage in an increas-
ingly competitive labour market. Human rights legislation which addresses dis-
crimination on the basis of ineluctable characteristics, does not deal with inequality 
that is increasingly expressed on a generational, occupational, and educational 
basis. 
Moreover, employment is no longer secure as the favoured means of organiz-
ing productive activity in a capitalist economy; unfree forms of labour — prison, 
indenture, and slave — and sweatshop conditions have increased internationally. 
In liberal societies, there has been a growth in the use of forms of labour that fall 
outside the traditional contract of employment, which, for all its inequality, was 
premised on a notion of mutuality. Nonstandard forms of employment, which 
includes a proliferation in independent contracting, may enhance individual free-
dom, but they also expose workers to greater risks.1 
The official discourses and institutions of industrial pluralist legality and 
industrial citizenship may be losing.their hegemonic status, but in Canada and 
Québec we have not yet reached a crisis of legitimacy. If such a crisis comes, it 
may initiate a more radical break than the transitions between the regimes examined 
here. These regimes were bom of workers' engagement with the liberal democratic 
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state, which, despite its limitations, still preserved the idea that citizenship mattered 
and that the boundary between the political and the economic was permeable. The 
liberal state could be made to respond to social demands democratically expressed. 
It could impose limits on private property and freedom of contract. 
The continuing political saliency of the liberal state can no longer be assumed. 
Democratic citizenship is being systematically narrowed by supra-national free 
trade regimes that require nation states to recognize the rights of property owners 
over the claims of their citizens. Such charters of corporate rights and international 
trade dispute resolution mechanisms have not been matched either by the guarantee 
of social rights or the creation of credible alternate institutions through which 
democratic demands can be effectively pursued. Instead of being a site for the 
mediation of class conflict, the liberal state is increasingly becoming a vehicle for 
imposing the discipline of the competitive market on its populations. Much of 
this has been accomplished by convincing people that they have no choice since 
the forces of globalization are irresistible. 
Increasingly, this ideological project is being contested. In the late 1990s, for 
example, the Days of Action campaign protested the Conservative government's 
attempt to institutionalize its slogan "Ontario: Open for Business."105 Public and 
private sector unions, together with social movements representing women, visible 
minorities, disabled people, and the poor, marched in nine cities across the province, 
closing businesses and disrupting normal activities. In Toronto, there was an 
unprecedented display of solidarity as close to a million people took to the streets. 
However, the campaign foundered not so much because it pushed the limits of 
legality, but more because it ran aground on existing forms of fragmentation. 
Although workers' participation in the Days of Action was met by employers who 
sought injunctions and labour board orders to ban unlawful economic action, 
adjudicative officials refused to do the dirty business of repressing workers. In a 
liberal democracy, when public opinion supports workers' collective action the 
constraints of the law are loosened. The more difficult problem has been to forge 
solidarity in the face of historical lines of fragmentation. Private sector unions, in 
general, consider that their members provide the labour power fuelling the engine 
of economic activity and have a correspondingly low respect for public sector 
workers, although in certain sectors this is changing. Thus, it is difficult to persuade 
them to make sacrifices for workers who they consider to be a tax burden. 
Moreover, despite declining membership, unions still have a much stronger finan-
Linda Weiss, "Globalization and the Myth of the Powerless State," New Left Review, 
225(1997), 3-27; Joachim H irsch, "Globalization of Capital, Nation-States and Democracy," 
Studies in Political Economy, 54(1997},39-58;Gary Teeple, Globalization and the Decline 
of Social Reform (Toronto 1995). 
Bryan Palmer, "Halloween in Harrisland," Canadian Dimension, 32,1 (January/February 
1998), 29-32; Marcella Munro, "Comment on Ontario's Days of Action and Strategic 
Choices for the Left in Canada," Studies in Political Economy, 53 (1997), 125-40. 
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cial base and more firmly established institutional supports than do social move-
ments, which tend to represent those people in the labour market who have only 
enjoyed a second-class industrial citizenship. With social movements considered 
by organized labour to be little more than a junior partner, there is little pressure 
on unions to expand beyond narrow economism to a full-fledged support for social 
unionism. So far, despite repeated examples of its limits, especially in the context 
of a global competition for capital, the labour movements in Canada and Québec 
remain committed to a political program that consists of supporting the social 
democratic party, rather than providing an alternative vision of how society should 
be organized. 
Economic restructuring and increased competition have exposed the limits of 
industrial pluralism. Although it is one of the highest mediations of the conflict 
between capital and labour, no legal regime can resolve the enduring problem of 
liberalism, the fundamental contradiction between labour as a commodity and the 
social solidarity necessary for the reproduction and sustenance of human life. All 
the regimes of industrial legality arise out of capitalist formations and the conflicts 
endemic to them. No regime has overcome or resolved finally the conflict that arises 
out of the commodification of labour power, although a central project of all of 
them has been to legitimate that commodification ideologically and materially, and 
to encourage existing organizations of workers to behave responsibly as wholesal-
ers of the labour power of their members. Liberal voluntarism accommodated craft 
workers in this way at the beginning of the 20th century, just as industrial pluralism 
accommodated industrial workers in core sectors fifty years later. 
But the material benefits that underwrite the ideological appeal of norms of 
voluntarism are only available to some workers for some of the time. Fragmentation 
and segmentation are inherent in the labour market, which, after all, is based upon 
competition between workers. "Given the fear induced by the basic insecurity of 
die labour market, workers tend to erect barriers against 'outsiders' in order to 
protect their 'privileged' position in relation to wages and the state."10 Women 
workers and immigrants are regarded as a source of competition that puts downward 
pressure on men's wages, and a decent social wage and strong public sector are 
seen as diminishing the purchasing power of wages. Too often these views have 
been accepted as common sense within the labour movement. The political effect 
of such Malthusian notions is to displace social conflict from the profit/wage 
relation to an internal struggle within the working class. 
There are indications, however, that some elements within organized labour 
have understood the limitations of strategies based upon the goal of narrow 
protectionism rather than that of social transformation. Campaigns that disclose the 
link between the imperatives of unbridled consumerism and sweated labour, 
especially in die international apparel and footwear industries, are gaining ground. 
Antonella Picchio, The Social Reproduction of the Labour Market (Cambridge 1992), 
138. 
306 LABOUR/LE TRAVAIL 
Some public sector unions have been able to teach their counterparts in the private 
sector the significance of socially necessary labour. In some industries, such as auto, 
workers are located in a segment of the labour market that enables them to tackle 
historical forms of fragmentation around the sexual division of labour and across 
generations through collective bargaining. The political challenge is to demon-
strate how rapacious capitalism really is and to link the exploitation of working 
people with other forms of invidious discrimination. The distinction between the 
traditional working class, as represented by the labour movement, and social 
movements, comprising among others women, racialized groups, and social wel-
fare recipients, must be abandoned because it reflects and reinforces, rather than 
challenges and minimizes, the social distinctions and political power that are part 
and parcel of labour market segmentation. 
A concerted attempt by working people, broadly understood, to challenge 
market voluntarism would likely be met by old-style coercion. An assault on trade 
union rights may be the trajectory for the reconstruction of a new regime of 
industrial legality in the neo-h'beral, global competitiveness state.108 But such a 
regime would undermine what little basis that continues to exist for social cohesion 
and social stability. Historically, working people have not passively acceded to 
institutional and lega! arrangements that fail to incorporate at least some of their 
demands. For legitimacy's sake, the nation state has leavened coercion with 
accommodation in responding to workers' collective action. It is unlikely that in 
the new millennium, despite the shift in power in its favour, capital can achieve on 
a global scale what it has been unable to achieve nationally. 
Kim Moody, Workers in a Lean World: Unions in the International Economy (London 
1997). 
los 
For some interesting reflections on these questions by a one-time active supporter of and 
participant in the industrial pluralist regime, see H.W. Arthurs, "Labour Law Without the 
State?,"University of Toronto LawJournal, 46(1996), 1-45. 
